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This paper estimates scal policy feedback rules in Japan, the United States, and the United
Kingdom for more than a century, allowing for stochastic regime changes. Estimating a Markov-
switching model by the Bayesian method, we nd the following: First, the Japanese data clearly
reject the view that the scal policy regime is xed, i.e., that the Japanese government adopted
a Ricardian or a non-Ricardian regime throughout the entire period. Instead, our results indicate
a stochastic switch of the debt-GDP ratio between stationary and nonstationary processes, and
thus a stochastic switch between Ricardian and non-Ricardian regimes. Second, our simulation
exercises using the estimated parameters and transition probabilities do not necessarily reject the
possibility that the debt-GDP ratio may be nonstationary even in the long run (i.e., globally
nonstationary). Third, the Japanese result is in sharp contrast with the results for the U.S. and
the U.K. which indicate that in these countries the government's scal behavior is consistently
characterized by Ricardian policy.
JEL Classication Numbers: E62
Keywords: scal policy rule; scal discipline; Markov-switching regression
1 Introduction
Recent studies about the conduct of monetary policy suggest that the scal policy regime has im-
portant implications for the choice of desirable monetary policy rules, particularly, monetary policy
rules in the form of ination targeting (Sims (2005), Benigno and Woodford (2007)). It seems safe
to assume that scal policy is characterized as \Ricardian" in the terminology of Woodford (1995),
or \passive" in the terminology of Leeper (1991), if the government shows strong scal discipline. If
Correspondence: Tsutomu Watanabe, Research Center for Price Dynamics, Hitotsubashi University, Kunitachi,
Tokyo 186-8603, Japan. E-mail: tsutomu.w@srv.cc.hit-u.ac.jp. We would like to thank Hiroshi Fujiki, Ippei Fujiwara,
Shin-ichi Fukuda, Takeo Hoshi, Eric Leeper, Kiyohiko Nishimura, Tatsuyoshi Okimoto, Masashi Saito, Matthew Shapiro,
John Taylor, David Weinstein, and the participants at the TRIO conference on December 16-17, 2010 in Tokyo for useful
suggestions and comments. This research is a part of the project entitled: Understanding Ination Dynamics of the
Japanese Economy, funded by JSPS Grant-in-Aid for Creative Scientic Research (18GS0101).
this is the case, we can design an optimal monetary policy rule without paying any attention to scal
policy. However, if the economy is unstable in terms of the scal situation, it would be dangerous
to choose a monetary policy rule independently of scal policy rules. For example, some researchers
argue that the recent accumulation of public debt in Japan is evidence of a lack of scal discipline on
the part of the Japanese government, and that it is possible that government bond market participants
may begin to doubt the government's intention and ability to repay the public debt. If this is the
case, we may need to take the future evolution of the scal regime into consideration when designing
a monetary policy rule.
Against this background, the purpose of this paper is to estimate scal policy feedback rules for
Japan, the United States, and the United Kingdom for a period spanning more than a century, so as
to gain a deeper understanding of the evolution of scal policy regimes. One of the most important
features of recent studies on scal policy rules is the recognition that scal policy regimes are not
xed over time, but evolve in a stochastic manner.1 For example, Favero and Monacelli (2005) and
Davig and Leeper (2007) estimate scal policy rules for the United States during the postwar period
under the assumption that there are two alternative scal regimes, i.e. a \passive" and an \active"
regime, and that stochastic uctuations between the two regimes may be characterized by a Markov
process. They nd that scal regime switching occurred fairly frequently: Davig and Leeper (2007)
report that there were twelve scal regime changes during the period of 1948-2004, while Favero and
Monacelli (2005) found that scal policy was even more unstable than monetary policy.2
However, these pioneering works still have some shortcomings. First, they do not make an empiri-
cal distinction between locally and globally Ricardian policy rules. For example, Favero and Monacelli
(2005) specify a locally Ricardian rule and ask whether the U.S. government has followed this rule or
deviated from it. However, as pointed out by Bohn (1998) and Canzoneri et al. (2001), the transver-
sality condition may be satised even if the debt-GDP ratio does not follow a stationary process, or
equivalently, even if a government deviates from a locally Ricardian policy rule. Second, the studies
by Davig and Leeper (2007) and Favero and Monacelli (2005) do not pay much attention to govern-
ments' tax smoothing behavior. As pointed out by Barro (1986) and Bohn (1998), tax-smoothing
1A comprehensive list of recent empirical studies on scal policy rules is provided by Afonso (2008).
2These studies are in sharp contrast with research on scal sustainability initiated by Hamilton and Flavin (1986)
about two decades ago, which typically investigates whether scal variables such as the debt-GDP ratio are characterized
by a stationary or a nonstationary process without any break (Trehan and Walsh (1988, 1991), Wilcox (1989), Ahmed
and Rogers (1995)).
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behavior may create a negative correlation between public debt and the primary surplus. Without
properly controlling for such behavior when estimating a government's reaction function, researchers
may easily obtain biased estimates of scal policy reactions to a change in public debt. Third, the
empirical approach of these studies is based on maximum likelihood estimation and implicitly assumes
that the debt-GDP ratio is stationary at least in the long run (i.e., that it is \Harris recurrent"). This
condition is satised if, for example, the debt-GDP ratio switches between two AR (p) processes,
one stationary and the other nonstationary, but the nonstationary regime is not visited too often or
for too long (Francq and Zakoian (2001)). However, there is no a priori reason to believe that this
condition is indeed satised for the debt-GDP ratio; it is possible that a non-Ricardian regime is
visited frequently and/or for a long time, depending on the transition probabilities. If this is the case,
maximum likelihood estimators will fail to follow a standard normal distribution even asymptotically
(Douc et al. (2004)).
We derive an estimating equation based on a model of optimal tax smoothing, paying particular
attention to dierences between locally and globally Ricardian rules, and then estimate the equation
by the Bayesian method. The main ndings of the paper are as follows. First, the Japanese data
set, covering the period 1885-2004, clearly rejects the view that the scal policy regime was xed
throughout the sample period, i.e., that the Japanese government adopted only one policy stance -
Ricardian or non-Ricardian - throughout the entire period. Rather, our empirical results suggest that
the scal policy regime evolved over time in a stochastic manner, and that the debt-GDP ratio is well
described by a Markov switching model with two or three states. Specically, Japanese scal policy is
characterized by a locally Ricardian rule in 1885-1925 and 1950-1970. The former roughly corresponds
to the period when Japan had adopted the gold standard, under which the government was forced to
maintain a balanced budget. Japan left the gold standard in 1917. The latter period corresponds to
the period of scal restructuring just after WWII, when the Japanese government, under the direction
of the Supreme Commander for Allied Powers (SCAP) introduced a balanced budget system as part
of the so-called \Dodge Line" in order to stop runaway ination. On the other hand, Japanese
scal policy is characterized by non-Ricardian rules in 1930-1950 and 1970-2004, suggesting that the
Japanese government abandoned scal discipline not only during WWII, but also in the most recent
period starting in 1970. These empirical results are conrmed as being quite robust to changes in
empirical specications.
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Second, given that the Japanese debt-GDP ratio switches between stationary and nonstationary
processes, one may wonder to what value the debt-GDP ratio goes to in the long run. To address
this question, we conduct stochastic simulation exercises using the estimated transition probabilities,
and nd that the debt-GDP ratio is quite likely to increase over the next 20 years, but will start
declining after that and nally converge to zero. This implies that the debt-GDP process is \globally
stationary" (i.e., stationary across regimes), although it may not necessarily be locally stationary (i.e.,
stationary within each regime).3 However, we also nd that this result is not very robust to changes
in the specication of the estimating equation, such as the number of possible \states," and in some
cases, we nd global nonstationarity.
Third, we apply our methodology to U.S. and U.K. data sets to nd that the scal behavior of
the U.S. government throughout the entire sample period, 1840-2005, may be described as switching
between locally Ricardian policy rules, while the behavior of the U.K. government during the entire
sample period, 1830-2003, can be characterized as switching between globally Ricardian policy rules.
Thus, the U.S. and U.K. results are in sharp contrast with the result for Japan. The U.S. result is
consistent with Bohn (1998, 2008), but diers from Favero and Monacelli (2005) who report that U.S.
government behavior deviated from Ricardian policy for most of their sample period, 1961-2002.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 explain our empirical
approach, while Section 4 explains our data set. Section 5 presents the regression results. Section 6
concludes the paper. A detailed explanation of our data set is provided in Appendix.
2 Ricardian scal policy
2.1 The government's budget constraint
We start by looking at the government's budget constraint. Let us denote the nominal amount of
public debt and base money at the end of period t by Bt and Mt. Also, we denote the one-period
nominal interest rate starting in period t  1 by it 1, the nominal government expenditure (excluding
interest payments) and the nominal tax revenue in period t by Gt and Tt. Then the consolidated ow
budget constraint of the government and the central bank takes the following form:
Mt +Bt = (1 + it 1)Bt 1 +Mt 1 + (Gt   Tt):
3The recent behavior of investors in the Japanese government bond market seems to be consistent with this as they
show no hesitation to purchase government bonds even though the government is lacking scal discipline and rapidly
accumulating public debt.
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Dividing both sides of this equation by nominal GDP, Yt, we obtain:







where mt, bt, st, and nt are dened by
mt  Mt
Yt
; bt  Bt
Yt
; st  Tt  Gt
Yt
; nt  Yt   Yt 1
Yt 1
:
Denoting the total consolidated liabilities by wt( mt + bt), the transition equation for wt can be
expressed as:










Note that it 11+ntmt 1 represents seignorage and that an increase in the primary surplus st or seignorage
reduces total liabilities. Also note that an increase in the nominal growth rate nt contributes to low-
ering total liabilities through the second term on the right-hand side,   nt1+ntwt 1, which is sometimes
called the \growth dividend" (Bohn (2008)).
Equation (1) can be rewritten as




where qt represents a discount factor that is dened by
qt  1 + nt+11 + it :
Integrating equation (2) forward from the current period and taking expectations conditional on
information available in period t, we obtain a present-value expression of the budget constraint:



































wt+T = 0: (3)
2.2 Locally Ricardian policy rules
Woodford (1995) proposes that a scal policy commitment be called \Ricardian" if it implies that the
transversality condition, equation (3), necessarily holds for all possible paths of endogenous variables
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(in particular, prices). More specically, Woodford (1995, 1998) proposes two types of Ricardian scal
policy rule.










wt 1 + t; (4)
where t is a time-varying parameter satisfying 0 < t  1, which represents the government's
responsiveness to changes in total liabilities, and t is an exogenous stationary variable. Note that
the left-hand side of equation (4) represents the sum of the primary surplus and seignorage. Equation
(4) requires the government to create a surplus in period t great enough to cover its interest payment
in that period, it 11+ntwt 1.
By substituting (4) into (1), we can fully characterize the dynamics of wt:
wt =

1  t   nt1 + nt

wt 1   t: (5)
Under the assumption that nt is an exogenous process (i.e., the government treats nt as exogenously
given when making a scal decision in period t),4 this equation implies that wt would be a stationary
process and thus satises the transversality condition if the sum of t and nt1+nt lies between zero and
unity.5 Note that the assumption of a locally Ricardian policy requires that 1   t is smaller than
unity, while stationarity of w requires that the coecient on wt 1 in (5) is less than unity. These two
conditions are closely related but not identical except for the case of nt = 0.













wt 1 + t: (6)
Note that ^t  t + nt1+nt . Now the government seeks to adjust the sum of the primary surplus,
seignorage, and the growth dividend in response to changes in total liabilities. An important dierence
from equation (4) is that the government reduces the primary surplus when the growth dividend is
positive, for example, due to high ination, and increases it when the growth dividend is negative; on
4It is possible that nt could be an endogenous variable in the sense that the government's scal behavior could have
non-negligible consequences on the path of nt. For example, as argued by Woodford (2001) among others, it might
be possible that if the government does not react at all to changes in total liabilities (that is, t = 0), then ination
endogenously emerges (nt > 0), and consequently the coecient on wt 1 in equation (5) becomes less than unity.
5Note that, from an econometric point of view, wt is a stationary process if the coecient on wt 1 in equation (5)
lies between -1 and 1 ( 1 < 1 t  nt1+nt < 1). However, it seems safe to rule out the possibility that w converges over
time to a constant value with oscillation, so that we can concentrate on the condition that the coecient lies between
0 and 1 (0  1  t   nt1+nt < 1).
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the other hand, equation (4) requires the government to create a primary surplus independently of
the level of the growth dividend. It can be easily seen that the transition equation corresponding to





wt 1   t; (7)
and that wt is a stationary process if ^t satises the condition that 0 < ^t  1.
Favero and Monacelli (2005) adopt a policy reaction function very close to equation (6). According
to their denition, a government with scal discipline seeks to keep the primary decit lower than the









Given this denition, the debt-stabilizing decit becomes positive if nt takes a suciently large positive
value, implying that the government can run a decit.
2.3 Globally Ricardian policy rules
The idea that the government should maintain a surplus large enough to at least cover interest
payments seems to be a useful one from a practical point of view,6 but the transversality condition
does not necessarily require it. Specically, as shown by Bohn (1998) and Canzoneri et al. (2001),
the transversality condition could be satised even if the government reacts to an increase in total
liabilities by less than the amount needed to cover its interest payments. This is the second type of
Ricardian policy, which is referred to as \globally Ricardian."




mt 1 = twt 1 + t; (8)
where t is a time-varying parameter satisfying 0 < t  1. Note that equations (4) and (6) require
the government to generate a primary surplus that is sucient to cover its interest payments in each
period. Here, however, the government can now issue additional debt to pay interest on the existing
debt at the beginning of that period. Under this policy rule, the dynamics of wt are now given by
wt =





wt 1   t (9)
6If we rewrite equation (4) as st  it 11+nt bt 1 = twt 1+t, we see that the rule requires that not the primary surplus
but the traditional scal surplus (i.e., primary surplus less interest payment) be adjusted in response to a change in
total liabilities, which is the idea underlying the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact. See Woodford









wt 1   t; (10)
which implies that the transversality condition (equation (3)) is satised if 0 < t  1qt 1 .7 Note
that this condition does not necessarily guarantee that wt is a stationary process; in fact, it allows wt
to grow forever, but at a rate lower than the interest rate in each period. In that sense, a globally
Ricardian rule imposes a weaker condition on government behavior than a locally Ricardian rule.
Bohn (1998, 2008) adopts a policy reaction function very close to equation (8) and looks at U.S.
data to determine whether t is positive.8 Equation (8) is an appropriate estimating equation when
the government adopts a globally Ricardian policy or when it actually adopts a locally Ricardian
policy but interest rates do not uctuate much during the sample period. In the latter case, we would
be able to empirically distinguish between a locally and a globally Ricardian policy just by looking at
whether the estimated coecient on wt 1 is greater than the sample average of the nominal interest
rate. However, if the government adopts a locally Ricardian policy and uctuations in interest rates
are not small, then Bohn's specication may not be appropriate. For example, the estimated coecient
on wt 1 may become biased towards zero if uctuations in interest rates are quite large during the
sample period while those in public debt are negligibly small.
3 Estimation method
3.1 Estimating equations
Given the two denitions of Ricardian scal policy above, we estimate an equation of the form
bt =
8<:
0 + (0 + t)bt 1 + u0t; if St = 0
1 + (1 + t)bt 1 + u1t; if St = 1
(11)
where uit = "it   t with "it  i:i:d: N(0; 2i ).9 fSt 2 (0; 1)g is a two-state Markov chain with
transition probabilities pij = Pr(St = j j St 1 = i). Note that, given that the current regime is i,
7Again, we rule out the possibility that the coecient on wt 1 in (9) or (10) is below zero.
8However, Bohn (1998, 2008) does not consider the possibility that the scal regime evolves over time in a stochastic
manner.
9It is assumed that the error term, "it, is uncorrelated with bt 1. A usual justication of this assumption is that
bt 1 is predetermined. In this paper, we will employ this orthogonality assumption following the previous studies such
as Bohn(1998). However, it should be noted that bt 1 may not necessarily be a predetermined variable but a forward-
looking variable in some models. If this is the case, the coecient on bt 1 is no longer consistently estimated because
of the presence of endogeneity problem. See Li (2010) for more on this issue.
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the expected average duration of staying in the same regime is (1   pii) 1. Also, note that we use
public debt issued by the government bt as the dependent variable rather than the total liabilities wt,
assuming that the amount of base money mt is small relative to the public debt and that uctuations
play a much less important role in seignorage than in the primary surplus.
We specify four dierent estimation equations based on dierent denitions of the observable
variables, t and t.
Specication 1 t = t = 0: This is the benchmark case in which no exogenous variables are
included. Hence, bt follows a simple Markov-switching AR(1) process.
Specication 2 t = 0, and t =  gmt : This is a case in which government tax smoothing behavior
is incorporated through gmt (military expenditures relative to GDP). As pointed out by Barro (1986)
and Bohn (1998), the government's tax-smoothing behavior may create a negative correlation between
public debt and the primary surplus. To illustrate this, consider a situation in which the government
increases its expenditures, but only temporarily (such as in the case of a war). The government
could increase taxes simultaneously by the same amount as the increase in expenditures, but it is
costly to change marginal tax rates over time, since doing so increases the excess burden of taxation.
Recognizing this, an optimizing government would seek to smooth marginal tax rates over time.
This implies that a temporary increase in government expenditures would lead to a decrease in the
primary surplus and an increase in public debt. Bohn (1998) argues that such a negative correlation
between the primary surplus and public debt should be properly controlled for when estimating the
government's reaction function; otherwise researchers may easily obtain imprecise estimates of scal
policy reactions to an increase in public debt. Bohn (1998, 2008) shows that empirical results for the
U.S. sharply dier depending on whether or not temporary government expenditures are included as
an independent variable, while Iwamura et al. (2006) report a similar nding for Japan during the
post-war period.
Specication 3 t =   nt1+nt , and t =  gmt : This specication corresponds to equation (5)
with i = 1   i. Note that when nt is very close to 0, specication 3 reduces to specication 2.
This condition might hold in a very stable economy without any experience of high ination, but
unfortunately, this is not the case for Japan, which experienced three-digit ination rates just after
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the end of WWII. Of course, Japan is not an exception, and one can easily nd other examples in
which the accumulation of public debt leads to uncontrollably high ination. For such countries,
specications 2 and 3 are not identical.
Specication 4 t =   nt1+nt +
it 1
1+nt
, and t =  gmt : This corresponds to equation (9) with
i = 1   i. This specication diers from specication 3 in that interest payments, it 11+nt , are
included in t, reecting the fact that the government is not required to create surplus to cover its
interest payments. Note that a globally Ricardian policy requires i to be less than unity, implying
that, when nt is always equal to zero, bt could continue to grow forever, but at a rate lower than the
borrowing cost in each period.
Later in Section 5, we will estimate each of the four equations shown above; we will pay a particular
attention to the specications 3 and 4, each of which describes the scal behavior of a government
with scal discipline (i.e. locally or globally Ricardian) and tax smoothing motivation.
3.2 Estimation
We estimate equation (11) by employing a Bayesian approach via the Gibbs sampler instead of a
classical approach based on maximum likelihood estimation. The Bayesian approach has the following
advantages. First, the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) has the potential disadvantage that
inference on St is conditional on the estimates of the unknown parameters. We estimate the parameters
of the model and then make inferences on St conditional on the estimates of the parameters as if we
knew for certain the true values of the parameters. In contrast, the Bayesian approach allows both
the unknown parameters and St to be random variables. Therefore, inference on St is based on the
joint distribution of the parameters and St (see Kim and Nelson (1999)).
Second, for the Markov switching models, the likelihood is often not uni-modal but multi-modal.
Therefore, numerical algorithms such as Expectation Maximization (EM) and Newton-Rapson algo-
rithms sometimes converge to a local maximum on the likelihood surface. This is a typical problem
encountered with data in practice, regardless of which optimization algorithms are used. Maddala and
Kim (1998) argue that the maximum likelihood estimation method is fragile as multiple local maxima
are often found.
Third, MLE follows a non-standard limiting distribution when the process is nonstationary in the
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long run (or globally nonstationary). To our knowledge, such limiting distributions have not been
derived for Markov-switching models. On the other hand, the Bayesian method can approximate the
joint and marginal distributions of the parameters and St via a Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
simulation method such as the Gibbs sampler. The method is valid even when the observed process
exhibits non-stationarity (or explosive) behavior in the long run (see Sims (1988)). To illustrate this
point, let us suppose there are two scal policy regimes: one is a stable regime in which the debt-
GDP ratio is characterized by a stationary process, and the other one is an unstable regime in which
the debt-GDP ratio is characterized by a nonstationary process. Note that the mere existence of an
unstable regime does not necessarily imply global instability: The system could still be globally stable
if the unstable regime is not visited too often or for too long. In this sense, the transition probabilities
of the Markov chain are important determinants of global stability or instability. On the other hand,
as shown by Francq and Zakoian (2001), it is possible that the system is globally unstable even when
both of the two regimes are stable. An important point to be emphasized here is that it would not
be appropriate to employ MLE if it is uncertain whether the system is globally stable.10
3.3 MCMC simulation
The rst time the Gibb sampler was used in a Bayesian analysis of Markov switching models was
in the study by Albert and Chib (1993). The Gibbs sampler is used to approximate the joint and
marginal distributions of the parameters of interest from the conditional distributions of the subsets
of parameters given the other parameters (see Kim and Nelson (1999) for an introduction to Gibbs
sampling). It is useful in this case because the joint distributions are dicult to obtain.
We follow Kim and Nelson (1999) to estimate a model of the form:
bt =
8<:0 + 0bt 1 + "0t; if St = 0
1 + 1bt 1 + "1t; if St = 1
where bt = bt   tbt 1 + t and "it  i:i:d:N(0; 2i ) for i = 0; 1 with 2St = 20(1 + h1St) and h1 > 0.
fSt 2 (0; 1)g is a two-state Markov chain with transition probabilities pij = Pr(St = j j St 1 = i).
10An alternative empirical framework to study scal regime shifts would be to use the methodology proposed by Bai
and Perron (1998), in which a multiple linear regression model with l breaks (or l + 1 regimes) is examined within the
classical framework. However, this approach requires the process to be weakly stationary in each regime. Therefore,
their method cannot be applied in our context.
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Note that the two states are assumed to be identied not by St but by 
2
St
, simply because we want
to know if there is any dierence between the two states in terms of St .
3.3.1 Prior distributions
Next we describe the choice of priors for the unknown parameters. Let eh1 = 1+h1 with h1 > 0. Then
the priors are the following:







), eh1  IG(2 ; 2)1(h˜1>1),
p11  beta(u11; u10), p00  beta(u00; u01)
The parameters used are  = 0, ! = 25,  = 0, c = 1, (; ) = (0; 0), u00 = u11 = 8, and
u10 = u01 = 2. Hence the prior of 2i is non-informative. The other parameters are chosen so that
the priors are informative but relatively diused. The means and standard deviations of the prior
distributions are presented in the following table.
Priors for the parameters
Distribution Mean Std. Dev.
i Normal 0.00 0.20
i Normal 0.00 1.00
pii Beta 0.80 0.12
20 Inverted Gamma | |eh1 Inverted Gamma | |
3.3.2 Computational algorithm
The needed posterior conditional distributions for implementing Gibbs sampling are easily obtained
from the priors and the assumptions of the data generating process. The following steps 1 through 5
are iterated to obtain the joint and marginal distributions of the parameters of interest.
Step 1: Generate p11 and p00 conditional on eST = (S1; :::; ST ). Let nij refer to the total number of
transitions from state i to j, which can be counted from eST . Then
p11 j eST  beta(u11 + n11; u10 + n10)
p00 j eST  beta(u00 + n00; u01 + n01)
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Step 2: Generate i conditional on eST , 2i , and i. We have the regression yt = i + "it where











i + ! 
35
Step 3: Generate i conditional on eST , 2i , and i. Let dt = bt   i, then we have the regression















Step 4: Generate 20 and 
2
1 conditional on eST , i; and i. We rst generate 20 conditional on
h1 and then generate eh1 = 1 + h1 to indirectly generate 21 . Conditional on h1, the posterior










0 =  + T









1 =  + T1
1 =  +RSS1=20
with T1 =
PT
t=1 St. Once eh1 is obtained, we can calculate 21 .
Step 5: Generate eST = (S1; :::; ST ) conditional on the other parameters. This is conducted using
multi-move Gibbs sampling, which was rst introduced by Carter and Kohn (1994) in the context
of a state-space model. Here the procedure for generating eST using the multi-move Gibbs-
sampling is the same as that in Kim and Nelson (1999).
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We iterate steps 1 through 5 M + N times and discard the realizations of the rst M iterations
but keep the last N iterations to form a random sample of size N on which statistical inference can
be made. M must be suciently large so that the Gibbs sampler converges. Also, N must be large
enough to obtain the precise empirical distributions. Taking these aspects into consideration, we set
M = 5000 and N = 10000.
4 Data
We construct a data set covering the period 1885-2004 for Japan, 1840-2005 for the United States,
and 1830-2003 for the United Kingdom.11
4.1 Japan
Public debt Public debt is dened as the amount of gross debt issued by the central and local
governments at the end of each scal year.12 To convert the gures reported in various budget
documents into a format consistent with the SNA, we make adjustments by excluding the amount of
debt issued under the Colonial Special Accounts and the Public Enterprise Special Accounts, both of
which are outside the general government according to the SNA denition.13
Nominal GDP A single data set covering the entire sample period is not available, so that we
collect data from various sources and link them in a consistent way. For the period after FY1936,
we use a data set produced by the Japanese government (various versions of the SNA), while for the
period before FY1935, we basically use Ohkawa et al. (1974). However, since data are completely
missing for the nal stage of WWII (FY1944 and 1945), we estimate the real GDP in these two
years by using the index of industrial production and the index of agriculture, forestry and shery
11See Appendix for details. All data we use are available upon request. All data we use are available upon request.
12The data for the debt issued by the central government are taken from various documents published by the Ministry
of Finance, including \Japanese Government Bonds Statistics," \The Financial History of the Meiji and Taisho Period
in Japan," the \Annual Report on Japanese Government Bonds Statistics," and \Budget Statistics," while the data
for the debt issued by local governments is taken from documents issued by the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry
of Home Aairs (Ministry of Internal Aairs and Communications), including \The Financial History of the Meiji and
Taisho Period in Japan," \Local Government Bonds Statistics," the \Annual Publication on Local Public Finance,"
and the \Annual Report on Local Public Finance Statistics."
13We use various denitions of the general government: For 1885-1954, we use the denition by the Economic
Counsel Board, for 1995-1969, the OLD SNA, for 1970-1979, the 68SNA, and for 1980-2004, the 93SNA. Note that
these denitions slightly dier from each other, because special accounts held by the central government and business
accounts held by local governments are sometimes classied as part of the general government and sometimes not.
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production,14 and the GDP deator by using the agricultural price index, the production goods price
index, and the consumer price index.
Government interest payments The data for government interest payments for FY1885 to 1929
are taken from Emi and Shionoya (1966) for FY1885 to 1929, while those for FY1952 to 2004 are from
various documents published by the government, including the \White Paper on National Income,"
the \Annual Report on National Income Statistics," and the \Annual Report on National Accounts."
As for the period between FY 1930 and FY1951, we estimate interest payments closely following the
methodology adopted by Emi and Shionoya (1966).
Military expenditure For the years after FY1947, we use the gures referred to as \National
Defense and Related Aairs" in various issues of the \Settlement of General Account Revenues and
Expenditures" published by the Ministry of Finance. The data for FY1946 are taken from Economic
Counsel Board (1954), while for the years before FY1946, we use the data from Emi and Shionoya
(1966).
As for military spending during wartime, that is, FY1937 to FY1945, we dene this as expenditures
spent only by the forces at home, and do not include expenditures spent by the forces overseas. This
is consistent with our denition of public debt in which those debts issued under the ve Colonial
Special Accounts (namely, the Chosen Government, Taiwan Government, Kwantung Oce, Karafuto
Oce, and Nanyo Oce) are not included.15
4.2 The U.S. and the U.K.
For the United States, the data are taken from the \Historical Statistics of the United States" (Carter
et al. (2006)) and the \Historical Tables, Budget of the United States Government" published by
the Oce of Management and Budget. For the United Kingdom, the data sources are the \British
14This methodology closely follows the one used by the Japanese central bank in its various publications on nancial
and economic activities around the end of the WWII (see, for example, Bank of Japan (1950)).
15However, as one might imagine, a non-negligible portion of expenditures spent by the forces overseas was nanced
by the central government through the issue of public debt, especially at the nal stage of WWII. Ideally, this portion
should be included in our denition of military expenditure, but we do not do so because reliable gures for that portion
are not available. However, to see how sensitive our empirical results are to this treatment of military expenditures, we
created an alternative series of military expenditures using a tentative estimate by Emi and Shionoya (1966) for military
spending by the forces overseas that were nanced by the central government through the Colonial Special Accounts,
and repeated the same empirical exercise as in Section 5. We were able to conrm that the basic empirical ndings are
not sensitive to the denition of military spending.
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Historical Statistics" (Mitchell (1988)), the \Annual Abstract of Statistics" published by the Oce
for National Statistics, and the Public Sector Finances Databank by HM Treasury.
5 Empirical results
5.1 Preliminary analysis
The trend in the debt-GDP ratio for Japan, the U.S., and the U.K. is shown in Figure 1. We see
that there are three major periods of debt accumulation in Japan. The rst period, 1904 to 1905,
is the period of the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905). Reecting a substantial increase in military
expenditure, the debt-GDP ratio increased to over 50 percent at the end of 1905; however, it started
to decrease again right after the end of the war and the decline continued until, in 1918, the debt-GDP
ratio had returned to the pre-war level. Given that there was no remarkable growth dividend during
this period (the nominal growth rate in 1906-1915 was 5.4 percent per year on average), one can
see that this downward trend mainly came from scal reconstruction, including substantial spending
reductions.16 As pointed out by many researchers, the government during this period had a strong
political will to restore budget balance so as to avoid the risk of a massive outow of gold under the
gold standard system.
The second phase of debt accumulation was 1920 to 1944, i.e., the period that includes WWII.
The increase in the debt-GDP ratio accelerated following the outburst of war with China in 1937,
and the ratio eventually reached 1.8 when the war ended in 1945. However, as can be seen in Figure
1, the debt-GDP ratio dropped precipitously right after the end of the war, all the way to a level
very close to zero. This is an episode of inationary erosion of the debt, or \partial default," due to
hyper-ination during this period.17
Finally, the most recent phase of debt accumulation started in the early 1970s and continues until
today. A series of reforms in the social security system, including the introduction of indexation in the
public pension system, have been implemented since the Tanaka administration declared a changeover
to the welfare state in 1973. This accumulation of debt continued until the government nally started
scal reconstruction in the latter half of the 1980s, including a substantial cut in spending and the
introduction of a consumption tax in 1989. However, the debt-GDP ratio started to increase again in
16Although Japan won the war, it received no war reparations from Russia.
17The rate of ination in terms of the GDP deator was 273 percent in 1945, 175 percent in 1946, and 154 percent
in 1947.
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the 1990s, at least partially due to the collapse of the asset price bubble in the early 1990s.
In Table 1, we decompose changes in the debt-GDP ratio into four components: the contribution
of primary decit; the contribution of interest charge; the contribution of real GDP growth; and the
contribution of ination. Focusing on the three phases in which the debt-GDP ratio declined, we see
the following. The rst phase, 1906 to 1916, is the period immediately after the end of the Russo-
Japanese war. The debt-GDP ratio declined by 4.3 percent per year. Importantly, it came mostly
from a reduction of primary decit, implying that the scal reconstruction during this period was
a successful one. On the other hand, the decline of the debt-GDP ratio in 1945 to 1948 was much
larger than that in the preceeding phase, but this came not from a reduction of primary decit but
from ination. Finally, the debt-GDP ratio declined in 1987 to 1990 by 2 percent per year. The
contribution of primary decit was 3.9 percent, suggesting that scal reconstruction was going on
during this period. However, public debt had already reached at a very high level at this time, thus
the contribution of interest charge was high. As a result, the contribution of decit with interest,
which is dened as the sum of the contribution of primary decit and the contribution of interest
charge, was positive, contributing to an increase (rather than a decrease) in the debt-GDP ratio.
This is sharply contrasted with what happened during the scal reconstruction in 1906-1916. The
debt-GDP ratio did decline in 1987-1990, but it mainly came from high economic growth.
Turning to the U.S. and the U.K., we see that the main cause of debt accumulation was increases in
military expenditures during wartime. Specically, the U.S. debt-GDP showed a rapid and substantial
increase in 1861-66, 1916-19, and 1941-46, respectively corresponding to the Civil War, WWI, and
WWII periods. The debt-GDP ratio for the U.K. is also characterized by three spikes, created by the
Napoleonic War, WWI, and WWII. A notable dierence with the Japanese data is that in both of these
countries there was no major ination comparable to Japan's hyper-ination in 1945-47. It should
also be noted that the U.S. and the U.K. have never experienced an uncontrollable accumulation of
public debt during peacetime, which again is in sharp contrast with the Japanese experience since the
early 1970s.
Table 2 presents a standard ADF test for the debt-GDP ratio in Japan, the U.S., and the U.K.
Specically, we run an AR (p) regression of the form
bt = + bt 1 +
p 1X
j=1
j4bt j + ut (12)
17
for the entire sample period with no break. We repeat this with various lag lengths (p = 1 to 10) to
nd that the estimates of  are very close to unity, and thus the null hypothesis H0 :  = 1 cannot
be rejected for each of the three countries.
But does this necessarily imply that the debt-GDP ratio follows a unit root process throughout the
entire sample period? In order to examine this, we conduct a rolling regression of equation (12) with a
window of 40 years; for example, the estimated value for 1925 is from a regression conducted over the
period 1885-1925. The lag length is set to p = 2. The results are shown in Figure 2 and show for Japan
that the estimate of  uctuates substantially in a range from 0.6 to 1.1, suggesting that the time-
series properties of the debt-GDP ratio changed signicantly at least several times. Specically, the
estimate of  shows a sharp rise during WWII, indicating that the Japanese government abandoned
scal discipline during this period. On the other hand,  shows a sharp decline during the period
just after the war, probably reecting the fact that hyper-ination during that period quickly reduced
the real value of public debt. It should also be noted that the value of  has stayed very close to (or
slightly above) unity since the latter half of the 1980s, suggesting that the debt-GDP ratio has been
following a unit root process or even an explosive process during this most recent period.
In contrast with the Japanese result, the estimates of  for the U.S. and the U.K. do not show
large uctuations. Basically, the estimates stay below unity, except that the U.S. estimate shows a
sharp rise during WWII.18
5.2 Empirical results for Japan
Table 3 presents the regression results for Japan obtained from a two-state model. Panel A of the table
shows a benchmark regression in which no exogenous variables are included (namely, specication 1).
The estimate of  in regime 0 is 0.517, indicating that the debt-GDP ratio is characterized by a
stationary process that converges to its mean quite quickly. On the other hand, the estimate of 
in regime 1 is 1.116. Since its lower bound (1.067) exceeds unity, we cannot reject the null that the
debt-GDP ratio follows an explosive process.19 Figure 3 presents the estimated probability of regime
1 in each year of the sample period, as well as the estimated coecient on bt 1, which is calculated
18In addition,  shows a sharp decline during high ination periods (the 1920s in the U.S. and the U.K., and the
1950s in the U.K.), again probably reecting the fact that the real value of public debt quickly decreased due to high
ination.
19Note that the estimate of the constant terms  is below zero, implying that b explodes to negative innity if b starts
at an extremely low level. However, this is unlikely to occur, given that the estimate of  is very close to zero, and not
signicantly dierent from zero.
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as a weighted average of the coecients in regimes 0 and 1, with the estimated probabilities of each
regime being used as a weight. The shaded area represents the 95 percent condence interval. Figure
3 shows that the years except 1945-1970 fall under regime 1 and that the coecient on bt 1 exceeds
unity except during the period 1945-1970.
Panel B of Table 3 shows the results of a similar regression, but this time we added military
expenditures as an exogenous variable (specication 2). Again, the debt-GDP ratio is characterized
by a stationary process for regime 0 and an explosive process for regime 1. The estimated coecient
on bt 1, shown in Figure 3, looks quite similar to the previous case, except that the coecient is now
lower than unity in 1890-1905 (the period of the Sino-Japanese and the Russo-Japanese Wars) and
1915-1920 (the period of WWI).
Panel C of Table 3 reports the regression result for the case in which military expenditure and
the growth dividend,   nt1+nt bt 1, are included as exogenous variables (specication 3). Again, we see
that regime 0 is characterized by a stationary process and regime 1 by an explosive process. But a
notable dierence from the previous two specications is that the estimate of  in regime 0 is now
much closer to unity, indicating that convergence to its mean is much slower. Specically, the estimate
of  in specication 1 (0.5177) implies that the debt-GDP ratio declines to half of its initial value
after about 1.05 years, while the one in specication 3 (0.9178) implies that the half-life is 8.08 years.
The surprisingly quick decline in the debt-GDP ratio found in specications 1 and 2 mainly reects
the fact that the debt-GDP ratio fell very quickly during the hyper-ination period in 1945-47. This
problem is now xed by properly controlling for the growth dividend. Figure 3 now shows that the
probability of regime 1 is close to unity in 1930-1950 and 1970-2004, while the probability of regime 0
is high in 1885-1925 and 1950-1970. These results suggest that the former periods are characterized
by a lack of scal discipline, while the latter periods are characterized by a locally Ricardian rule.





bt 1 are included as exogenous variables (specication 4). The results are basically
the same as those for specication 3, except that the estimates of  in regimes 0 and 1 are both
lower, conrming that the assumption of a globally Ricardian policy is weaker than that of a locally
Ricardian policy.
In sum, we nd that the Japanese government made several large changes with respect to its scal
behavior over the past 120 years. Specically, Japanese scal policy is characterized by a locally
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Ricardian rule in 1885-1925 and 1950-1970. The former largely corresponds to the period in which
Japan had adopted the gold standard under which the government was forced to maintain a balanced
budget until Japan left the gold standard in 1917, following the same move by the core countries of
the system.20 The second period follows the scal restructuring ushered in in December 1948, when
SCAP instructed the Japanese government to implement a balanced budget in order to stop runaway
ination.21 On the other hand, Japanese scal policy is characterized by a non-Ricardian rule in
1930-1950 and 1970-2004, suggesting that the Japanese government abandoned scal discipline not
only during WWII, but also in the most recent period starting in 1970.22
5.3 Sensitivity analysis
AR (2) model The baseline regressions reported in Table 3 assume that the government adjusts
the primary surplus in period t in response to a change in public debt at the beginning of period
t. Given that we use annual data, this seems to be a good approximation to actual policy making.
However, as often pointed by researchers and practitioners, it usually takes more than one year before
scal decisions are nally made. If this is the case, our baseline specication may not be appropriate.






k=1 !0kbt k + tbt 1 + u0t; if St = 0
1 + 1
PK
k=1 !1kbt k + tbt 1 + u1t; if St = 1
where !0k and !1k are parameters satisfying
PK
k=1 !ik = 1 and representing the lag structure of scal
decision making.23 The estimating equation is now given by
bt =
8><>:
0 + (0 + t)bt 1 +
PK 1
k=1 0k4bt k + u0t; if St = 0
1 + (1 + t)bt 1 +
PK 1
k=1 1k4bt k + u1t; if St = 1
20See Shizume (2001) for more on the Japanese government's scal behavior during the gold standard period.
21For details on the \Dodge Line," see, for example, Cohen (1950) and Yamamura (1967).
22Markov switching models, including our model given by equation (11), are based on the assumption of recurring
states. This may not be an appropriate way to describe the evolution of scal policy rules. For example, the Ricardian
rule in 1885-1925 may not necessarily be identical to the one in 1950-70. It is beyond the scope of this paper to
fully address this issue, but we estimated a random coecient model, in which the estimating equation is given bt =
 + (t   nt1+nt +
it 1
1+nt
)bt 1 + gmt + t, where t follows a random walk process (t = t 1 + disturbance). The
regression result shows that  exceeds unity (i.e. non-Ricardian rule) in 1945, 1965-1985, and 1995-2004, and stays
below unity for the other years. This is basically the same as our baseline result.
23Note that this specication diers from a partial adjustment model, such as the one adopted by Favero and Monacelli
(2005), in that the coecient on lagged values of b depends only on the current regime (and not on past regimes).
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where ik   i!i;k+1. We conducted a lag search to end up with K = 2. The results of the
regressions using this equation are reported in Table 4 and Figure 4 and are basically the same as
before. In addition, the coecient on 4bt 1, denoted by  in Table 4, is very close to zero in each
regime, indicating that the AR (1) specication is not a binding constraint.
Net public debt The baseline regressions use gross public debt issued by the central and local
governments rather than net debt. This is based on the assumption that governments own only a
small amount of nancial assets and that uctuations in the amount of nancial assets over time are
insubstantial. However, as pointed out by Broda and Weinstein (2005), Japan's public sector, through
its social security funds, holds non-negligible amounts of nancial assets. According to their estimate,
net debt held by the Japanese public sector at the end of FY2002 was equivalent to 64 percent of
GDP, while the corresponding gross gure was 161 percent. Obviously, the dierence is not trivial.
To evaluate how sensitive the baseline results are, we re-estimate our equations replacing gross
debt with net debt. The net debt data we use here are the data published by the Economic and Social
Research Institute (ESRI), Cabinet Oce, which cover the general government, including the central
and local governments and the social security funds. Unfortunately, however, the ESRI data cover
only the postwar period starting in 1955, so that the estimation is conducted only for this shorter
sample period.
Figure 5 compares Japanese general government gross and net debt. Although the dierence
between the two in terms of the vertical distance is indeed substantial, we still see a common long-
term trend: Namely, both start to increase around 1970 and basically continue to rise over the next
35 years. Comparing the estimation result reported in Table 5 with the baseline result (Table 3), we
see no change in that the debt-GDP ratio is characterized by a stationary process in regime 0 and a
nonstationary process in regime 1. We may therefore safely conclude that our baseline results are not
particularly sensitive to the denition of public debt.
Somewhat interestingly, however, if one looks closely at Figure 6, one can see a substantial decline
in the probability of regime 1 during the latter half of the 1980s. Correspondingly, the coecient on
bt 1 fell below unity during this period in specication 3 and more clearly in specication 4. The latter
half of the 1980s famously is a period of scal reconstruction during which the Japanese government
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intensively cut expenditure to achieve the target of \no net issuance of government bonds."24 One
may interpret the decline in the coecient on bt 1 during this period as reecting the restoration of
scal discipline.25 However, the coecient on bt 1 started to increase again in the early 1990s and
has remained very close to unity since.
Automatic stabilizers Recent empirical studies on scal policy rules emphasize the importance
of automatic stabilizers in explaining uctuations in the scal surplus/decit (see Taylor (2000),
Auerbach (2003), and Bohn (1998)). For example, Taylor (2000), using U.S. data for 1960-1999,
nds that the cyclical surplus was highly correlated with uctuations in the output gap but this
was not necessarily the case for the structural surplus. To control for this eect in our regression
exercise, we add the output gap to the estimating equations. Specically, we closely follow Barro
(1986) and Bohn (1998) by introducing a new variable, Y V ARt, which is dened as Y V ARt 
(1   Yt=Y t )(Gt =Yt), where Yt is the real GDP, Y t is its trend component estimated by HP lter,
and Gt is the trend component of real government spending. The regression results presented in
Table 6 show that the coecient on Y V AR is around 0.7 and signicantly dierent from zero in both
specications, indicating that automatic stabilizers did play an important role even in the Japanese
case. However, the coecient of main interest to us, , is almost the same as before, suggesting that
the baseline result is not sensitive to whether we control for the output gap or not.
No restriction on the coecient on interest payments As we can see from equations (4) and
(8), the sole dierence between locally and globally Ricardian rules is what kind of restriction we im-
pose on the coecient on interest payments it 11+ntwt 1. Locally Ricardian rules impose the restriction
that the coecient should be equal to unity, while globally Ricardian rules impose the restriction
that it should be zero. The former corresponds to specication 3, while the latter corresponds to
specication 4. An important implication of these restrictions, whether the coecient should be zero
or unity, is that these specications allow a switching only between locally Ricardian rules and other
rules (i.e., rules that do not belong to locally Ricardian rules) in the case of specication 3, and a
24See, for example, Ihori et al. (2001) for more on scal reform eorts during this period.
25Figure 6 shows that the coecient on bt 1 during the latter half of the 1980s is slightly below unity but not
statistically dierent from unity in specication 3, while it is signicantly smaller than unity in specication 4. This
implies that the scal regime during this period is characterized not by a locally Ricardian but a globally Ricardian rule.
This result is perfectly consistent with the fact that the government indeed aimed at \no net issuance of government
bonds" but had little intention of going further than that, i.e., it had no intention to reduce the debt-GDP ratio to a
lower level or even zero.
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switching only between globally Ricardian rules and the other rules in the case of specication 4.
These specications would be inappropriate if, for example, policy switching occurs between locally
and globally Ricardian rules.
To deal with this potential problem, we conduct a similar regression as before but now do not
impose an a priori restriction on the coecient on interest payments. Specically, we add a new
independent variable it 11+nt bt 1 to equation (11) with
t =   nt1 + nt ; t =  g
m
t :
The coecient on the new independent variable should be close to zero if the true rule is well approx-
imated by a locally Ricardian rule, and it should be unity in the case of a globally Ricardian rule.
The results are shown in Table 7 and indicate that the estimated coecient is 0.628 in regime 0 (the
stationary regime) and 0.506 in regime 1 (the nonstationary regime). More importantly, the lower
bound in regime 0 is 0.235, rejecting the null of zero, while the upper bound in regime 0 is slightly
lower than unity (0.990), again rejecting the null of unity. This means that the true rule is not well
approximated by the two extremes (i.e., locally and globally Ricardian rules) but is located between
them. The same results can be seen for regime 1.26 However, the estimated values of  in Table 7
tend to fall between those obtained in specications 3 and 4 of Table 3, conrming that the main
results regarding scal policy behavior in Table 3 hold without any substantial modications.
Three-state model The robustness of the ndings in Table 3 are examined in Table 8 by extending
the analysis to a three state model. Panel A, which reports the regression results for specication 3,
shows that regime 0 is characterized by a stationary process ( = 0:926), regime 1 by an explosive
process ( = 1:081), and regime 2 by another highly explosive process ( = 1:313). Figure 9 shows
that the periods falling under regime 1 in Figure 3 are again classied as regime 1,27 suggesting that
the number of regimes allowed in Table 3 (namely, two regimes) is not an inappropriate description
of the true model. These results, together with the results for specication 4, more or less conrm
the earlier ndings: (1) the periods 1885-1920 and 1950-1970 fall under regime 0 (a regime with scal
discipline); (2) the period 1920-1950 falls under regime 1 (a regime without scal discipline).
26These results suggest that neither empirical studies focusing only on locally Ricardian rules nor those focusing only
on globally Ricardian rules employ an appropriate estimating equation.
27The exceptions are 1944 and 1970-1980, years in which the debt-GDP ratio recorded an extremely high growth rate,
so that they are classied as regime 2.
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5.4 Are debt ratios globally stationary or nonstationary?
The regression analysis in this section seeks to determine whether the debt-GDP ratio follows a
stationary process within a regime. However, as we discussed earlier, even if the ratio is stationary
within a regime, this does not necessarily imply that it is stationary in the long run. This is simply
because regime changes occur stochastically in accordance with transition probabilities. Thus, what
we need to know is where the debt-GDP ratio is headed in the long run given the estimated transition
probabilities, or, put dierently, we need to know whether its distribution converges over time to a
certain distribution. A process is said to be globally stationary if the distribution converges to a
certain distribution over time, while stationarity within a regime is called local stationarity. Global
stationarity implies that the eect of policy shocks on the debt-GDP ratio becomes smaller and smaller
over time and nally disappears in the long run. Investors in government bonds markets are interested
in whether this global stationarity is satised or not, and policymakers, especially central banks, are
interested in this property when designing monetary policy rules.
Francq and Zakoian (2001) obtain a result regarding the relationship between local and global
stationarity that is of some interest in the present context, namely that local stationarity is neither a
necessary nor a sucient condition for global stationarity. For example, suppose there are two regimes
and one satises local stationary while the other does not. Even in this combination, the process could
be globally stationary. On the other hand, even if each of the two regimes satises local stationarity,
this does not necessarily imply global stationarity.28
As we saw in Table 3, the regression results using a two-state model show that one regime satises
(local) stationarity while the other one does not. Also, as we saw in Table 8, the regression results
using a three-state model indicate that one regime satises (local) stationarity, but the other two do
not. Given these results, one may wonder if they imply global stationarity or nonstationarity. To












bt 1 + u1t; if St = 1
for a two-state model and the corresponding equation for a three-state model. Here, parameters with
28Gali (2007) provides a clear and interesting discussion of the implications of Francq and Zakoian's (2001) result on
the determinacy of an equilibrium in a monetary economy.
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a hat represent the values estimated in the earlier regressions. More specically, we randomly draw
policy shocks and policy regimes using the parameters and transition probabilities obtained from the
regression of specication 3 and generate a replication for the time series of the debt-GDP ratio over
1000 years for various paths of the nominal growth rate (nt) that are exogenously determined. We
repeat this process 5000 times to obtain a distribution of the debt-GDP ratio in every year of the
1000 years. We can say that the debt-GDP process is globally stationary if this distribution is stable
over time; otherwise it is globally nonstationary.
Table 9 reports the rst, second, and third quartiles of the simulated distribution with T = 500
(500 years later) and T = 1000 for the two-state and three-state models. In Panel A it is assumed
that the initial regime is a stationary one (i.e., S0 = 0), and that the debt-GDP ratio in period 0
is zero. On the other hand, in Panel B, it is assumed that the initial regime is a nonstationary one
(S0 = 1) and that the initial debt-GDP ratio is unity (100 percent). The simulation results from the
two-state model show that the distribution is stable over time, irrespective of the initial conditions
and the assumed values of nominal growth rates (n), clearly indicating that the debt-GDP ratio
satises global stationarity. On the other hand, the results from the three-state model show that the
distributions with T = 500 and T = 1000 dier signicantly for the case of n = 0:00, 0:03, and 0:06,
implying that the process is globally nonstationary.29
Figure 10 presents a similar simulation conducted to forecast the future path of the debt-GDP
ratio over the next 100 years. To make the initial condition as close to the current situation in Japan
as possible, we assume that the initial regime is S0 = 1 and that the debt-GDP ratio in period 0 is 1.7,
which is the actual gure at the end of 2004. According to the result from the two-state model with
3 percent nominal growth, the \third quartile" line goes up until it reaches 3 with T = 20, indicating
that a further increase in the debt-GDP ratio is quite likely to occur over the next 20 years. After
that, however, the debt-GPD ratio enters a declining trend as a result of the switch to a stationary
regime and then converges to a quite narrow (and probably tolerable) band within 100 years. On
the other hand, the result from the three-state model with 3 percent nominal growth shows that the
median of the distribution increases quite quickly to reach an unrealistic and intolerable level within
50 years, and that its variance increases over time, clearly indicating global nonstationarity.
29However, when n goes up to 0:10, the distributions with T = 500 and T = 1000 become identical, suggesting that
suciently high nominal growth could make the debt-GDP ratio globally stationary. The threshold for nominal growth
rates is about 8 percent, which is lower than the sample average (13.7 percent).
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5.5 Empirical results for the U.S.
Table 10 presents the regression results for the United States using a two state model. Results for
specication 3, presented in Panel A, indicate that each of the regimes, 0 and 1, is characterized
by a stationary process. This implies that the U.S. government's scal behavior during the sample
period can be described as a switching between locally Ricardian policy rules. If we turn to the
results for specication 4, presented in Panel B, they again indicate that each regime, 0 and 1,
satises stationarity, implying that U.S. scal policy is characterized by a switching between globally
Ricardian rules.
These results suggest that the U.S. government's scal behavior consistently has been very close to
locally Ricardian policy throughout the entire sample period. In fact, the estimated coecient on bt 1,
presented in Figure 11, consistently and statistically signicantly remains below unity. If we compare
these results with those reported in previous studies on U.S. scal policy, we nd some similarities.
Bohn (2008), for example, regressed the U.S. primary surplus on public debt for a sample period
from 1793 to 2003 and reports that the OLS estimate of the coecient on public debt is positive and
signicantly dierent from zero when tax smoothing eects are properly controlled for. Bohn interprets
this result as providing evidence for a globally Ricardian rule; but since the estimated coecient is
typically greater than the average interest rate level, this could be interpreted as suggesting a rule
that is even locally Ricardian. Bohn (1998) conducts a similar exercise using data for 1916-1995 and
nds that the coecient on public debt is signicantly positive not only for the entire sample period,
but also for ve sub-sample periods, including the postwar period. These results reported by Bohn
(1998, 2008) are consistent with ours.
Favero and Monacelli (2005) estimate an equation that is very close to our specication 1 (equation
(6)) using the maximum likelihood method and report that U.S. government behavior has been devi-
ating from Ricardian policy for most of the entire sample period (1961-2002), except that it was close
to a locally Ricardian rule during the period of 1995-2001. Although their results cannot be directly
compared to ours because the empirical methodologies dier in several respects, we still attempt to
do so by adjusting our sample period to theirs. Panels C and D of Table 10 show the results of a
regression that is similar to that underlying Panels A and B, but that now uses data for the postwar
period. The regression results indicate that the estimate of  in regime 0 is less than unity, suggesting
that it is a stationary regime as before, but that the upper bound of  in regime 1 slightly exceeds
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unity, so that we fail to reject the null of a unit root. Fluctuations in the estimated coecient on
bt 1, presented in Figure 11, show that it has been slightly higher than unity since 1975, implying the
possibility that the U.S. government started to deviate from Ricardian policy around 1975. However,
the gure clearly shows that the estimated coecient on bt 1 is consistently less than unity during the
period before 1975 and that there is no evidence for the return to Ricardian policy around 1995 that
Favero and Monacelli (2005) detected. Thus, there are certain inconsistencies between their results
and ours. 30
Given that U.S. scal policy is characterized by switching between stationary regimes, we may
apply a model with multiple breaks, as proposed by Bai and Perron (1998), to the U.S. data. This
model does not require researchers to assume that policy regime switching is a recurrent phenomenon,
and that it has a Markov property. This is an important advantage, but on the other hand it requires
the debt process to be weakly stationary in each regime, so that we cannot apply it to the Japanese
data. The regression results reported in Table 11 show that regime changes occur four times (i.e., there
are ve dierent regimes) with both specications 3 and 4. According to the result for specication
4, the estimate of  is slightly higher than unity during the wartime period (regime 3, 1917-1943)
but is signicantly smaller than unity in the other four regimes. These results may be interpreted as
conrming our earlier results obtained from the Markov switching regression.31
5.6 Empirical results for the U.K.
Table 12 presents the regression results for the United Kingdom using a two-state model. Results
for specication 3 indicate that regime 0 is characterized by a stationary process, while regime 1 is
characterized by a unit root process (the upper bound of  slightly exceeds unity). On the other hand,
results for specication 4 indicate that both regime 0 and regime 1 are characterized by a stationary
process, implying that the U.K. government's scal behavior is characterized by switching between
globally Ricardian rules.
30We also estimated specication 1, which is very close to the estimating equation employed by Favero and Monacelli
(2005), for the entire sample period as well as for the postwar period, but found that both regimes are stationary ones.
31However, the results for specication 3 are not very informative since  exceeds unity in three out of the ve regimes.
This result may be interpreted as evidence against applying the Bai-Perron method even to the U.S. data.
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6 Conclusion
This paper estimated scal policy feedback rules in Japan, the United States, and the United Kingdom
for more than a century and allowing for stochastic regime changes. By estimating a Markov switching
model by the Bayesian method, we arrived at the following ndings. First, the Japanese data clearly
reject the view that the scal policy regime has been xed, i.e., that the Japanese government has
adopted a regime that is either Ricardian or non-Ricardian throughout the entire period. Rather,
our results indicate a stochastic switch of the debt-GDP ratio between stationary and nonstationary
processes and thus a stochastic switch between Ricardian and non-Ricardian regimes. Specically,
Japanese scal policy was characterized by a locally Ricardian rule in 1885-1925 and 1950-1970 but
by a non-Ricardian rule in 1930-1950 and 1970-2004. Second, through simulation exercises using
the estimated parameters and transition probabilities, we showed that the debt-GDP ratio may be
nonstationary even in the long run (i.e., globally nonstationary). Third, the Japanese result stands
in sharp contrast with the results for the U.S. and the U.K., which indicate that in these countries,
government scal behavior has been consistently characterized by Ricardian policy.
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The denition of \general government" varies over time and there are four such denitions for the
time span of our sample period: the denition by the Economic Counsel Board (ECB) for 1885-1954,
the OLD SNA for 1955-1969, the 68SNA for 1970-1979, and the 93SNA for 1980-2004. The ECB's
denition is described in Economic Counsel Board (1954) and in the Kokumin Shotoku Hokoku [Report
on National Income] published by the ECB. A detailed classication table of government organizations
in the OLD SNA and the 68SNA is provided in Economic Planning Agency (1978). Finally, the 93SNA
denition is available from the Economic and Social Research Institute, Cabinet Oce website.
A.1.1 Public debt
Public debt is dened as the amount of gross debt issued by the central and local governments at the
end of each scal year (or calender year). The data for the debt issued by the central government are
taken from various documents published by the Ministry of Finance, including \Japanese Government
Bonds Statistics," \The Financial History of the Meiji and Taisho Period in Japan," the \Annual
Report on Japanese Government Bonds Statistics," and \Budget Statistics." The data for the debt
issued by local governments are collected from documents issued by the Ministry of Finance and the
Ministry of Internal Aairs and Communications, including \The Financial History of the Meiji and
Taisho Period in Japan," \Local Government Bonds Statistics," the \Annual Publication on Local
Public Finance," and the \Annual Report on Local Public Finance Statistics." To convert the gures
reported in various budget documents into a format consistent with the SNA, we make adjustments
by excluding the amount of debt issued under the Colonial Special Accounts and the Public Enterprise
Special Accounts, both of which are outside the general government according to the SNA denition.
Central government Central government gross debt consists of government bonds, nancing bills,
borrowings, and temporary borrowings. For 1885-1899, gures for these are taken from a table (pp.31-
32) in Ministry of Finance (1936). For 1900-1962, the gures are from Summary Table 1 (pp.4-5) in the
Kokusai Tokei Nenpo [Annual Report on Japanese Government Bonds Statistics], FY1975, published
by the Ministry of Finance. For 1963-2003, the data are obtained from Table 40 (pp.397) in the Zaisei
Tokei [Budget Statistics], FY2005, also published by the Ministry of Finance. Finally, for 2004 they
are from Summary Table 1 (pp.4-5) in the FY2004 edition of the Kokusai Tokei Nenpo.
However, we exclude the Colonial Special Accounts and Enterprise Special Accounts from any debt
held by the central government, because neither is classied as part of the general government. There
are ve Colonial Special Accounts: the Chosen Government, the Taiwan Government, the Kwantung
Oce, the Karafuto Oce, and the Nanyo Oce. As for Enterprise Special Accounts, the number of
accounts varies over time. The following is a list of special accounts that can be actually identied
from government debt statistics tables:
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For 1890-1954 : Steelworks, National Railway Service, Imperial Railway Service, Foodstu
Controls, National Forest Service, Telecommunication Service, Communication Enterprise,
Postal Service, Alcohol Monopoly, Taiwan Foodstu Controls, Chosen Foodstu Controls,
Printing Bureau, Precious Metals, Fuel Bureau, Demand and Supply Adjustment of Char-
coal and Firewood.
For 1955-1969 : Foodstu Controls, Postal Service, Postal Savings, Alcohol Monopoly,
Old Taiwan Foodstu Controls, Old Chosen Foodstu Controls, Silk Price Stabilization.
For 1970-1979 : Industrial Investment, Foodstu Controls, National Forest Service, Set-
tlers Loans, Postal Service, Postal Savings, Urban Development Loans, Alcohol Monopoly.
For 1980-2004 : Industrial Investment, National Schools, National Hospitals, Foodstu
Controls, National Forest Service, Postal Service, Postal Savings, Urban Development
Loans, International Trade Insurance, Agricultural Mutual Aid Reinsurance, Fiscal Loan
Program Funds, National Center for Advanced and Specialized Medical Care.
The data for government debt by account are obtained from Table 4 (pp.10-13) in the Kokusai
Tokei [Japanese Government Bonds Statistics], 1907, published by the Ministry of Finance for 1890-
1902.1 For 1903-2004, the data are from various issues of the Kokusai Tokei Nenpo, and Ministry of
Finance (1936, 1954).
Local government Local government gross debt consists of ordinary accounts bonds, public enter-
prise bonds, and business bonds. While ordinary accounts bonds are entirely included in the general
government debt, both public enterprise bonds and business bonds are not always included. This is
because some public management business accounts sometimes are classied as part of the general
government and sometimes not. In the ECB denition, no public management business accounts are
included as part of the general government. Therefore, for 1885-1954, ordinary accounts bonds are
only included in the general government debt. In the OLD SNA and the 68SNA, public enterprise ac-
counts for hospital projects (HPs) and sewage enterprise services (SESs) and other business accounts
except for those of prot-making business as well as ordinary accounts are classied as part of the
general government accounts. Thus, for 1955-1979 the local government debt is dened as the sum
of ordinary accounts bonds, public enterprise bonds for HPs and SESs, and business bonds for the
national health insurance, public-university-aliated hospitals (PUAHs), and public municipal pawn-
shops. In the 93SNA, the classication of HPs and PUAHs was switched from general government
to non-nancial public corporations. Therefore, for 1980-2004, all bonds issued under these business
accounts are excluded from the local government debt.
1For years before 1901, the statistics report no gures on government bonds held under the special account for the
imperial railway service; therefore, the debt held under this special account is included in the debt held by general
government during this period.
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Moreover, we include public enterprise bonds carried under the ordinary account (PEBOAs) in
the general government debt after 1974. However, in order to avoid the potentially severe problem
of double-counting some public enterprise bonds issued by HPs and SESs in the local government
debt, we need to subtract the amount of outstanding bonds belonging to these two accounts from the
total amounts of PEBOAs. Because we cannot directly obtain the data on PEBOAs by business, we
need to estimate them. We do so by rst calculating the ratio of outstanding public enterprise bonds
to the total sum by business account each year. Then, assuming that the percentage distribution of
PEBOAs by business is equal to the percentage distribution in outstanding public enterprise bonds,
we calculate the amount of PEBOAs held by HPs and SESs using this percentage share multiplied by
the total amounts of PEBOAs.
The data source for ordinary accounts and public enterprise and business bonds for 1885-1899 is
Table 1 (pp.732) in Ministry of Finance (1937); that for 1900-1911 is a table (pp.7) in the Chihosai
Tokei [Local Government Bonds Statistics], FY1912, published by the Ministry of Home Aairs; that
for 1912-1953 is the Chiho Zaisei Gaiyo [Annual Publication on Local Public Finance] also published by
the Ministry of Home Aairs; and that for 1954-2004 is the Chiho Zaisei Tokei Nenpo [Annual Report
on Local Public Finance Statistics] published by the Ministry of Internal Aairs and Communications.2
The 1945 value of ordinary accounts bonds is not available from the Chiho Zaisei Gaiyo and we
therefore estimate it using the data on \general local government bonds" reported in Ministry of
Finance (1983). The data source for PEBOAs is the Chiho Zaisei Yoran [Handbook of Local Public
Finance] published by the Institute of Local Finance.
A.1.2 Interest payments
Turning to interest payments, the data source for 1885-1929 is Table 7a (pp.172-173) in Emi and
Shionoya (1966). We calculate interest payments of the general government as the sum of inter-
est payments made by the central government and local governments. For 1885-1900, we construct
the calendar year series using the following calculation: (interest payments in the current scal
year)3/4+(interest payments in the previous scal year)1/4. For 1930-1951, because we cannot
obtain the data directly from Emi and Shionoya (1966) and various issues of the Kokumin Shotoku
Hakusho [White Paper on National Income] published by the Economic Planning Agency, we estimate
general government interest payments closely following Emi and Shionoya (1966). Figures for interest
payments by the central government are taken from various issues of the Kokusai Tokei Nenpo. On the
other hand, interest payments made by local governments are estimated by multiplying outstanding
local government debt by the average interest rate. We can obtain data on outstanding local govern-
ment debt for each level of interest rate from the Chiho Zaisei Gaiyo but not data on their weighted
2For 1912-1938, public enterprise bonds issued for electricity and gas supply projects are included in the total
outstanding local government bonds reported in the Chiho Zaisei Gaiyo. We therefore exclude public enterprise bonds
from the total outstanding to obtain the data for outstanding ordinary accounts bonds.
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average.3 Unfortunately, Emi and Shionoya (1966) do not provide an explanation of how they obtain
the weighted average of interest rates. We therefore estimate interest payments by local governments
using the values in the appendix table 1 as the average rate for each level of interest rate.4
APPENDIX TABLE 1: Weighted average of interest rates
Period: 1930-1949 Period: 1950-1951
Zero percent 0.0000 Under 3.5 percent 0.0155
Under 4.0 percent 0.0162 Under 4.0 percent 0.0381
Over 4.0 percent 0.0480 Under 5.0 percent 0.0496
Over 5.0 percent 0.0536 Under 6.0 percent 0.0562
Over 6.0 percent 0.0638 Under 7.0 percent 0.0644
Over 7.0 percent 0.0738 Under 8.0 percent 0.0752
Over 8.0 percent 0.0832 Under 9.0 percent 0.0839
Over 9.0 percent 0.0958 Under 10.0 percent 0.0964
Over 10.0 percent 0.1084 Over 10.0 percent 0.1088
However, for 1945 we cannot estimate interest payments by local governments because no data on
outstanding local government debt for each level of interest rate are available. We estimate interest
payments by the general government using the data on interest payments by the central government.
For 1952-1954, the data source is Table 3 (pp.128) in the Kokumin Shotoku Hakusho, FY1962. For
1955-1969, it is Account 4 (pp.24-27) in theKokumin Shotoku Tokei Nenpo [Annual Report on National
Income Statistics], 1978, published by the Economic Planning Agency. The data source for 1970-2004
is an income and outlay account of general government in the Kokumin Keizai Keisan Nenpo [Annual
Report on National Accounts] published by the Economic Planning Agency and the Economic and
Social Research Institute.
A.1.3 Military expenditure
As for the pre-World War II period, the data source is Table 10 (pp.186-189) in Emi and Shionoya
(1966). We dene military expenditure during this period as the sum of regular defense expenditure
and war expenditure (if any). Note that for the period 1904-1905, we revise the data on the expenditure
by the extraordinary military special account (EMSA), which is included in the war expenditure. The
EMSA expenditure for the period was almost entirely nanced through bond issues. However, we can
clearly observe a somewhat odd relationship between expenditure and bond issues in each year: For
1904, the expenditure is about 200 million yen larger than the issue of bonds, while for 1905 the issue
of bonds is about 200 million yen larger than the expenditure. This is because total revenues and
expenditures under the extraordinary military special account were sucient to balance out not for
3Figures on outstanding ordinary accounts bonds for each level of interest rate have been reported in the Chiho
Zaisei Gaiyo since 1950. For 1930-1949, we can obtain nothing but the outstanding data including ordinary accounts
bonds as well as public enterprise bonds. Therefore, we use them here.
4Our estimates are 93.1 for 1926, 107.3 for 1927, 116.7 for 1928 and 125.0 for 1929. The corresponding estimates by
Emi and Shionoya are 94.1 for 1926, 108.2 for 1927, 117.1 for 1928 and 125.0 for 1929. For 1952, our estimated value
is 13438.2 and the estimate by the Economic Planning Agency is 13352.0. The fact that the dierence between our
estimates and the estimates by Emi and Shionoya and the Economic Planning Agency is not large suggests that our
estimates of interest payments by local governments are precise.
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one scal year but for several scal years. This characteristic of the budget system prevents us from
determining to what extent the increase of bond issuance is caused by a change in expenditure in one
year. We revise the data on the EMSA expenditure by rst calculating the ratio of the outstanding
value of bonds issued to the total revenues for the period 1904-1905 in each year. We then multiply
this ratio by the total EMSA expenditure for the period. Note also that for 1937-1945, we use the
data labeled \Forces in the Home Land" in Table 10.
As for the postwar period, the data source for 1946 is Supplementary Table 25 (pp.283) in Economic
Counsel Board (1954). For 1947-2004, the data are obtained from various issues of the Ippan Kaikei
Sainyu Saishutsu Kessan [Settlement of General Account Revenues and Expenditures]. We dene
military expenditure as the sum of Boei Kankei-hi (Expenditures on national defense and related
aairs) and Shusen Shori-hi (Expenditures related to the termination of WWII, until 1956).
A.1.4 Nominal GDP
For the period 1885-1954, we construct nominal GDP data series by calculating nominal GNP less net
income abroad. For the period 1885-1935, the data on nominal GNP and net income abroad are taken
from Ohkawa et al. (1974) and Ohkawa and Shinohara (1979), while for the period 1936-1950 these
data are from the Kokumin Shotoku Hakusho, FY1963. Furthermore, for the period 1951-1954 they
are from the Kokumin Shotoku Tokei Nenpo, 1978. Note that for the period 1885-1943, we convert the
GDP data to a scal year series using the following calculation because Ohkawa et al. (1974), Ohkawa
and Shinohara (1979), and the Kokumin Shotoku Hakusho provide only data on a calendar year basis:
(nominal GDP in the current calendar year)3/4+(nominal GDP in the following calendar year)1/4.
For the period after 1954, GDP data are directly obtained from the Kokumin Keizai Keisan Nenpo.
Because ocial nominal GDP data in scal years are not available for the nal stage of World War II
(1944-1945), we estimate the real GDP and the GDP deator in these two years and then calculate
the nominal GDP by multipling them together.
Real GDP for 1944-1945 We use the series of real GDP on a calender year basis produced by
Mizoguchi and Nojima (1993) to estimate the one on a scal year basis for the period 1944-1945.
Specically, we construct the series in scal years using the following calculation: for the scal years
1943 and 1946, (real GDP in the current calendar year)3/4+(real GDP in the following calendar
year)1/4; for the scal year 1944, real GDP in the current calender year; and for the scal year 1945,
(real GDP in the current calendar year)1/2+(real GDP in the following calendar year)1/2. We
then estimate real GDP in scal years for 1944-1945 using those data for 1943-1946 and ocial real
GDP data for 1943 and 1946.
GDP deator for 1944-1945 We estimate the GDP deator for 1944-1945 using the data of an
aggregate price index for 1943-1946. The data on the aggregate price index for 1943 and 1946 (on the
basis of the period 1934-1936) are obtained from Supplementary Table 5 (pp.100-101) in the Kokumin
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Shotoku [National Income], FY1957, published by the Economic Planning Agency. Note that because
for years before 1946 the Kokumin Shotoku provides data only on a calendar year basis, for 1943 we
convert the aggregate price index to a scal year basis using the following calculation: (index value in
calendar 1943)3/4+(index value in calendar 1944)1/4. However, the data on the aggregate price
index for 1944-1945 are not available. We produce the data on the aggregate price index for the
scal year 1944-1945 closely following the methodology the Economic Planning Agency adopted in
the Kokumin Shotoku.
The aggregate price index consists of three indices: the agricultural price index, the production
goods price index, and the consumer price index. These indices are weighted using the following values,
respectively: 0.300, 0.250 and 0.450. First, we use an index of commodities for family maintenance
(on the basis of the 1937 calendar year) as the agricultural price index. The data are taken from Table
1 (pp.13) in the Noson Bukka Chosa Hokoku [Survey on Agricultural Prices], 1946-1948, published
by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. We change the base year from the 1937 calendar year
to the period 1934-1936 by multiplying the index by the link coecient, 1.180. Our calculated values
are 3.655 for the scal year 1944 and 12.081 for the scal year 1945.
Second, we estimate the production goods price index using the data of the eective wholesale
price index. The data in calender years (on the basis of the period 1930-1934) are obtained from
Supporting Table 2 (pp.100-101) in Bank of Japan (1948). However, we revise the index values for
1944 and January-August 1945. This is because the 1944 value is produced under the assumption
that the level of output in 1944, being unknown at the time of estimating the indices, was nearly
equal to that in 1943, and because the January-August 1945 value is produced using data for the
period 1937-1944. We rst construct the new value for 1944. Morita (1963), one of those who were
in charge of producing the eective price index, points out that various economic statistics published
after estimating the eective price index show a clear decrease in production in 1944 compared with
1943 and that it would be better to use not 115.0 but values around 110.0 for the index of transactions.
Using 110.0 as the transactions index value, our revised eective wholesale price index is 3.951, which
is 0.184 larger than the Bank of Japan index, 3.767. Then the revised eective wholesale price index
for January-August 1945 is 4.749, which is 0.147 larger than the Bank of Japan index, 4.602. We
change the base period from the period 1930-1934 to the period 1934-1936 by multiplying the index
by the link coecient, 0.91213. Our estimates of the production goods price index are 3.640 for the
scal year 1944 and 9.599 for the scal year 1945.5
Third, we estimate the consumer price index using the data of the Bank of Japan eective retail
price index. The data in calender years (on the basis of the period 1930-1934) are taken from Sup-
porting Table 3 (pp.103-104) in Bank of Japan (1948). The eective retail price index has the same
5We convert the eective wholesale price index on a calendar year basis to a scal year series using the following
calculation: for the scal year 1944, (index value in calendar 1944)3/4+(index value for January-August 1945)1/4;
and for the scal year 1945, (index value for January-August 1945)5/12+(sum of the seven months from September
1945 to March 1946)1/12.
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problem as the eective wholesale price index. In order to revise the data, we adopt the same method
used for the Bank of Japan eective wholesale price index. As a result of the revision, the eective
retail price index for 1944 is 4.504, which is 0.202 larger than the Bank of Japan index, 4.302, and
that for January-August 1945 is 5.408, which is 0.137 larger than the Bank of Japan index, 5.271. We
change the base period from the period 1930-1934 to the period 1934-1936 by multiplying the index
by the link coecient, 0.94251. Our estimates of the consumer price index are 4.012 for the scal year
1944 and 21.049 for the scal year 1945.6
A.1.5 Government revenue and expenditure
A single data set covering the entire sample period is not available. We collect data from various
sources and link them in a consistent way. For the period 1885-1929, we use the series produced
by Emi and Shionoya (1966) in which they have estimated government revenues and expeditures
following closely Economic Counsel Board (1954). For the period 1930-2004, the data are from vari-
ous documents published by the Economic Planning Agency and the Economic and Social Research
Institute.
For the period 1885-1929 For the period 1885-1900, we convert the series on a scal year basis
to the one on a calender year basis using the following calculation: (the gures in the current scal
year)3/4+(the gures in the previous scal year)1/4. On the expenditure side, all the series of
public sector are from Table 7a (pp.172-173) in Emi and Shionoya (1966). Gross capital formation of
public enterprises is dened as the sum of capital formations produced by public corporations inside
the central and local governments. As for public corporations of the central government, we can
obtain the data for the period 1912-1929 from Table A-2-(1) (pp.22) in Emi and Takamatsu (1962),
but not the data for the period 1885-1911. We thus estimate them using gross capital formation of
public sector, assuming that the fraction of gross capital formations of public corporations inside the
central government in total capital formations of public sector for the period 1885-1911 is equal to
the fraction average for ve years from 1912 to 1916. As for public corporations of local governments,
gross capital formation is dened as the sum of capital formations produced by the electricity supply
and gas supply business. The data are from Table 6 (pp.243, pp.245) in Emi (1971).
On the revenue side, all the series of public sector are from Table 7b (pp.174-175) and 7d (pp.178).
Total revenues are dened as the sum of the central and local governments' revenues. Note that we
subtract from total revenues grants and other transfers from the central governmet to local govern-
ments in order not to record redundantly revenues in the consolidated account of the central and local
governments. Unfortunately, we cannot directly obtain the data on surpluses produced by public
corporations from Table 7b and 7d, because Emi and Shionoya (1966) does not report a breakdown
of \Surplus of government enterprises" in which not only surpluses of public corporations but also
6We use the same calculation to make a scal year series as the one used for the eective wholesale price index.
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government interest receipts and rents are included. We thus collect the data on interests and rents
received by the central government and then estimate surpluses of public corporations by calculating
\Surplus of government enterprises" less interest receipts and rents. As for local governments, we does
not perform the same work as the central government since Emi and Shionoya (1966) has not estimated
surpluses produced by public corporations inside local governments due to data limitations. We con-
struct the series of interests and rents received by the central government following Emi and Shionoya
(1966). For the general accounts, interests, dividends and rents received by the Keijyo-bu (ordinary
category) and the Rinji-bu (extraordinary category) are counted in interest receipts and rents. For
the special accounts, interests, dividends and rents received by 38 special accounts are counted in.
Tha data are from the Sainyu Saishutsu So-kessan (or Genkeisho) [Settlement of Revenues and Ex-
penditures], the Ippan Kaikei Sainyu Saishutsu Kessan, and the Tokubetsu Kaikei Sainyu Saishutsu
Kessan [Settlement of Special Accounts Revenues and Expenditures], all of which were published by
the Ministry of Finance.
For the period 1930-1954 The main series of public sector for the entire period are from Table 3
(pp.128-129) in the Koumin Shotoku Hakusho, FY1962. For the period 1930-1951, the data on surplus
of public corporations are from Supplementary Table 24 (pp.281) in Economic Counsel Board (1954).
For the scal year 1952, those are from Supporting Table 6 (pp.39) in the Kokumin Shotoku Houkoku,
FY1953; for the scal year 1953, from Supporting Table 7 (pp.39) in the Koumin Shotoku, FY1954;
and for the scal year 1954, from Supporting Table 8 (pp.34) in the Kokumin Shotoku, FY1955. As for
gross capital formation of public corporations, the data for the whole period are from Supplementary
Table 23 (pp.277-279) in Economic Counsel Board (1954), Supporting Table 14 (pp.51) in theKokumin
Shotoku Houkoku, FY1953, Supporting Table 15 (pp.53) in the Koumin Shotoku, FY1954, and Table
5 (pp.138) in the Koumin Shotoku Hakusho, FY1962.
Yet, the Economic Planning Agency does not report all the series of public sector for the scal year
1945 due to the diculty in estimating them because of data limitations. On the expenditure side,
we use the consolidated net government expenditures, which are reported in the item labeled \Net
Total of General Government Expenditures" in Emi and Shionoya (1966, Table 6), to estimate total
expenditures of general government. We estimate transfers from general government to households
(social security transfers) following Economic Counsel Board (1954). Specically, transfers are dened
as the sum of pensions, health insurances, seamen's insurances, relief liability insurances for worker's
accident, pensions for public servants, and welfare benets. On the revenue side, we estimate general
government revenues following Economic Counsel Board (1954) and Emi and Shionoya (1966). General
government revenues are dened as the sum of tax revenues, social security contributions and property
incomes. Tax revenues are dened as the sum of national and local taxes. Social security contributions
are dened as the sum of those collected by the following two special accounts: the special account for
welfare insurances and for relief liability insurances for worker's accident. Finally, property incomes
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are dened as the sum of interests, dividends and rents received by general government. We perform
the same work as Emi and Shionoya (1966) to estimate the data on property incomes. The data
are mainly from the Ippan Kaikei Sainyu Saishutsu Kessan, the Tokubetsu Kaikei Sainyu Saishutsu
Kessan and the Chiho Zaisei Gaiyo.
For the period 1955-1969 The main series of expenditures and revenues of public sector for the
whole period are from Account 4 (pp.24-27) in the Kokumin Shotoku Tokei Nenpo, 1978. The data on
surplus of public corporations are from Table 4 (pp.56-57, pp.60-61) in the report. As for gross xed
capital formation of public corporations, the data for the period 1965-1969 are from Supporting Table
5 (pp.370) in the report, and those for the period 1955-1964 from Supporting Table 7 (pp.238-239) in
the Kaitei Kokumin Shotoku Tokei [Revised Report on National Income Statistics 1951-1967].
For the period 1970-2004 All the series for the whole period are from an income and outlay
account of general government in the Kokumin Keizai Keisan Nenpo, which is available online on the
website of the Economic and Social Research Institute.
A.2 The United States
Public debt The data source for 1840-1939 is Table Ea584-587 in Carter et al. (2006), Volume 5,
where we use \Public debt" (Ea587), while for 1940-2005, we use Table 7.1 in the Historical Tables,
Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year, 2007, published by the Oce of Management
and Budget, where we use \Gross Federal Debt." All gures are for the end of the scal year, that is,
December 31 for 1840-1842, June 30 for 1843-1976, and September 30 after 1977.
Nominal GDP The data source for 1840-1928 is Table Ca9-19 in Carter et al. (2006), Volume 3,
where we use series Ca10, while that for 1929-1947 is Table 1.1.5 in the National Income and Product
Accounts published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce. Because
these sources for the period before 1948 provide only calendar year data, for 1843-1947 we convert the
data to scal year data using the following calculation: for 1843, (nominal GDP in the rst half of the
year)2; and for 1844-1947, (nominal GDP in the current year)1/2+(nominal GDP in the previous
year)1/2. We obtain scal year data for 1948-2004 from Table 8.1 and for 2005 from Table 1.1.5 in
the National Income and Product Accounts.
Interest payments and military expenditure The data source for 1840-1970 is Table Ea636-643
in Carter et al. (2006), Volume 5. For the period 1840-1953, military expenditure is given by the sum
of \Army" (Ea638), \Navy" (Ea639) and \Air Force" (Ea640) expenditure, while for 1954-1970 we use
\Total (Department of Defense)" (Ea637). As for interest payments, we use \Interest on public debt"
(Ea641) for the entire period. For 1971-2005, the data source for military expenditure and interest
payments is Table 3.2 in the Historical Tables, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year,
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2007. We use \Subtotal, Department of Defense-Military" (series 051) for military expenditure and
\Interest on Treasury debt securities (gross)" (series 901) for interest payments.
A.3 The United Kingdom
Public debt The data source for 1830-1979 is Public Finance 7 in Mitchell (1988). We calculate
public debt as FUD + UFD for 1830-1868, FUD + UFD + OIB for 1869-1939 and TND + OIB
for 1940-1979, where FUD denotes funded debt, UFD unfunded debt, OIB outstanding investment
borrowing, and TND total national debt. The source for 1980-2003 is Table A10 in HM Treasury's
Public Sector Finances Databank. All gures are for the end of the scal year, that is, January 5 for
1830-1853 and March 31 after 1854.
Nominal GDP The data source for 1830-1947 is National Accounts 5 in Mitchell (1988). For
1830-1853, we use the calendar year series, because the term of the scal year is almost identical
to the calendar year. For 1854-1947, we construct scal year data using the following calculation:
(nominal GDP in the current year)3/4+(nominal GDP in the following year)1/4. The data source
for 1948-2003 is Table A2 in the United Kingdom Economic Accounts published by the Oce for
National Statistics, where we use the series BKTL. For 1948-1954, we construct scal year data using
the following calculation: (nominal GDP in the current year)3/4+(nominal GDP in the following
year)1/4.
Interest payments and military expenditures The data source for interest payments for the
period 1830-1966 is Public Finance 4 in Mitchell (1988). For 1830-1937, we use gures obtained by
subtracting \Debt Charges (Terminable Annuities)" from \Debt Charges (Total)" and for 1938-1966
we use \Debt Charges (Total)." The data source for 1967-2003 is the Annual Abstract of Statistics
published by the Oce for National Statistics, from which we use the item labeled \Service of the
National Debt." On the other hand, the data source for military expenditure for 1830-1979 is Public
Finance 4 in Mitchell (1988). We calculate military expenditure as ARM +NAV + EEV for 1830-
1904, ARM + NAV + AIF + EEV for 1905-1937 and ARM + NAV + AIF + CEN + EEV for
1938-1967, where ARM denotes army and ordnance expenditure, NAV navy expenditure, AIF air
force expenditure, CEN central expenditure and EEV gross expenditure on special expeditions, votes
of credit, etc. For 1968-1979, we use gures from the item labeled \Defense." The data source for
1980-2002 is the Annual Abstract of Statistics. We estimate military expenditure for 2003 using both
the Annual Abstract of Statistics value for 2002 and the Treasury's value for 2002-2003. The Treasury
value is obtained from Table 3.2 in the Public Expenditure Statistical Analyses, 2006.
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Table 1: Decomposition of Changes in Japan's Debt-GDP Ratio
Change in Contribution of Contribution of Contribution of Contribution of
Debt-GDP Ratio Primary Decit Interest Charge Real Growth Ination
1886-2004 0.3 2.4 1.7 -0.7 -3.1
1886-1905 1.4 1.8 1.1 -0.7 -0.8
1906-1916 -4.3 -3.7 2.4 -1.3 -1.7
1917-1944 4.3 6.3 2.1 -0.9 -3.2
1945-1948 -46.2 3.2 0.8 6.3 -56.6
1949-1986 1.0 1.4 1.1 -0.8 -0.7
1987-1990 -2.0 -2.2 3.2 -2.3 -0.7
1991-2004 6.3 3.9 2.7 -0.9 0.6
Table 2: Unit Root Tests
Japan U.S. U.K.
p  t-stat  t-stat  t-stat
1 0.9990 -0.02 0.9868 -1.04 0.9864 -1.17
2 0.9607 -1.31 0.9784 -2.09 0.9798 -2.21
3 0.9702 -0.94 0.9818 -1.74 0.9800 -2.15
4 0.9729 -0.80 0.9804 -1.86 0.9817 -1.94
5 0.9756 -0.68 0.9808 -1.79 0.9825 -1.84
6 0.9691 -0.82 0.9806 -1.78 0.9813 -1.94
7 0.9720 -0.71 0.9815 -1.67 0.9853 -1.54
8 0.9824 -0.43 0.9817 -1.63 0.9819 -1.91
9 0.9716 -0.67 0.9839 -1.42 0.9826 -1.82
10 0.9740 -0.58 0.9797 -1.81 0.9827 -1.78
Note: We conduct the standard ADF tests, bt =  + bt 1 +∑p 1
j=1 jbt j + ut, with various lag length. The null hypothe-
sis is  = 1 and the 10% critical value is -2.57 when the sample
size is 100 (see Hamilton (1994)). The sample periods for Japan,
the U.S. and the U.K. are 1885-2004, 1840-2005, and 1830-2003,
respectively.
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Table 3: Two-State Model for Japan
Panel A: Specication 1
Regime 0 Regime 1
LB Mean UB LB Mean UB
 0.0355 0.0512 0.0669 -0.0549 -0.0267 0.0023
 0.4783 0.5177 0.5529 1.0674 1.1168 1.1649
2 0.0006 0.0010 0.0018 0.0037 0.0050 0.0068
p11 0.9193 0.9658 0.9941
p00 0.7804 0.9078 0.9811
Panel B: Specication 2
Regime 0 Regime 1
LB Mean UB LB Mean UB
 0.0380 0.0535 0.0688 -0.0863 -0.0591 -0.0321
 0.3785 0.4134 0.4476 1.0424 1.0821 1.1233
2 0.0005 0.0009 0.0015 0.0024 0.0033 0.0044
p11 0.8978 0.9564 0.9900
p00 0.7706 0.8984 0.9792
Panel C: Specication 3
Regime 0 Regime 1
LB Mean UB LB Mean UB
 -0.0133 0.0036 0.0164 -0.0300 0.0073 0.0476
 0.8681 0.9178 0.9762 1.0167 1.0641 1.1110
2 0.0003 0.0005 0.0007 0.0022 0.0033 0.0049
p11 0.8552 0.9378 0.9867
p00 0.8778 0.9448 0.9864
Panel D: Specication 4
Regime 0 Regime 1
LB Mean UB LB Mean UB
 -0.0067 0.0056 0.0169 -0.0524 -0.0150 0.0193
 0.8126 0.8550 0.8998 1.0103 1.0536 1.1003
2 0.0003 0.0004 0.0006 0.0022 0.0033 0.0050
p11 0.8631 0.9440 0.9876
p00 0.8921 0.9469 0.9831
Note: The transition probability, pij , represents Pr(St = j j St 1 = i).
The columns labeled \LB" and \UB" refer to the lower and upper bound
of the 95% condence interval and the columns labeled \Mean" refer to
the mean of the marginal distribution of the parameter.
46
Table 4: AR(2) Model
Panel A: Specication 3
Regime 0 Regime 1
LB Mean UB LB Mean UB
 -0.0088 0.0069 0.0185 -0.0298 0.0075 0.0383
 0.8572 0.9004 0.9578 1.0151 1.0558 1.1028
 0.0218 0.1227 0.3150 -0.0099 0.1009 0.1999
2 0.0003 0.0004 0.0006 0.0020 0.0030 0.0045
p11 0.8782 0.9454 0.9883
p00 0.8752 0.9412 0.9827
Panel B: Specication 4
Regime 0 Regime 1
LB Mean UB LB Mean UB
 -0.0058 0.0079 0.0189 -0.0489 -0.0125 0.0248
 0.8007 0.8429 0.8933 0.9979 1.0449 1.0871
 0.0317 0.1213 0.2190 -0.0024 0.0854 0.1745
2 0.0002 0.0004 0.0005 0.0019 0.0030 0.0045
p11 0.8689 0.9467 0.9855
p00 0.8868 0.9439 0.9876
Note: The transition probability, pij , represents Pr(St = j j St 1 = i).
The columns labeled \LB" and \UB" refer to the lower and upper bound
of the 95% condence interval and the columns labeled \Mean" refer to
the mean of the marginal distribution of the parameter.
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Table 5: Net Public Debt
Panel A: Specication 3
Regime 0 Regime 1
LB Mean UB LB Mean UB
 -0.0333 -0.0213 -0.0144 0.0075 0.0276 0.0415
 0.7131 0.9227 0.9916 0.9916 1.0311 1.0737
2 0.0001 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002 0.0005 0.0010
p11 0.7812 0.9040 0.9783
p00 0.7321 0.8799 0.9674
Panel B: Specication 4
Regime 0 Regime 1
LB Mean UB LB Mean UB
 -0.0276 -0.0211 -0.0140 -0.0009 0.0202 0.0356
 0.7961 0.8822 0.9412 0.9770 1.0185 1.0572
2 0.0001 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 0.0005 0.0009
p11 0.7855 0.9052 0.9788
p00 0.7159 0.8701 0.9583
Note: The transition probability, pij , represents Pr(St = j j St 1 = i). The
columns labeled \LB" and \UB" refer to the lower and upper bound of the 95%
condence interval and the columns labeled \Mean" refer to the mean of the
marginal distribution of the parameter.
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Table 6: Automatic Stabilizers
Panel A: Specication 3
Regime 0 Regime 1
LB Mean UB LB Mean UB
The coecient 0.4700 0.7765 1.1077 0.3547 0.7559 1.1602
on Y V AR
 -0.0103 0.0031 0.0163 -0.0263 0.0152 0.0564
 0.8696 0.9192 0.9631 1.0117 1.0598 1.1073
2 0.0003 0.0005 0.0007 0.0024 0.0039 0.0061
p11 0.8603 0.9397 0.9879
p00 0.8903 0.9482 0.9851
Panel B: Specication 4
Regime 0 Regime 1
LB Mean UB LB Mean UB
The coecient 0.4811 0.8034 1.1901 0.3282 0.7032 1.1213
on Y V AR
 -0.0073 0.0067 0.0188 -0.0514 -0.0099 0.0323
 0.8054 0.8505 0.9008 0.9992 1.0483 1.0948
2 0.0003 0.0004 0.0006 0.0025 0.0040 0.0062
p11 0.8626 0.9423 0.9880
p00 0.8796 0.9459 0.9875
Note: The transition probability, pij , represents Pr(St = j j St 1 = i). The columns
labeled \LB" and \UB" refer to the lower and upper bound of the 95% condence
interval and the columns labeled \Mean" refer to the mean of the marginal distri-
bution of the parameter.
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Table 7: No Restriction on the Coecient on Interest Payments
Regime 0 Regime 1
LB Mean UB LB Mean UB
The coecient on 0.2351 0.6283 0.9907 0.1046 0.5064 0.8778
interest payments
 -0.0088 0.0052 0.0174 -0.0431 -0.0062 0.0336
 0.8228 0.8772 0.9367 1.0155 1.0617 1.1075
2 0.0003 0.0004 0.0006 0.0022 0.0033 0.0048
p11 0.8668 0.9420 0.9884
p00 0.8826 0.9454 0.9850
Note: The transition probability, pij , represents Pr(St = j j St 1 = i). The columns labeled
\LB" and \UB" refer to the lower and upper bound of the 95% condence interval and the
columns labeled \Mean" refer to the mean of the marginal distribution of the parameter.
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Table 8: Three-State Model
Panel A: Specication 3
Regime 0 Regime 1 Regime 2
LB Mean UB LB Mean UB LB Mean UB
 -0.0448 -0.0018 0.0232 -0.0533 -0.0241 0.0193 -0.3370 -0.0425 0.0438
 0.8518 0.9261 1.0657 1.0428 1.0819 1.1122 1.1850 1.3136 1.5440
2 0.0001 0.0003 0.0006 0.0005 0.0007 0.0011 0.0006 0.0081 0.0154
p00 0.7937 0.9111 0.9783
p01 0.0053 0.0560 0.1523
p10 0.0018 0.0388 0.1067
p11 0.8357 0.9235 0.9796
p20 0.0015 0.0666 0.2667
p21 0.0149 0.1353 0.3272
Panel B: Specication 4
Regime 0 Regime 1 Regime 2
LB Mean UB LB Mean UB LB Mean UB
 -0.0002 0.0153 0.0262 -0.0731 -0.0602 -0.0469 -0.0624 -0.0266 0.0051
 0.7958 0.8283 0.8673 1.0625 1.0840 1.1013 1.1971 1.2783 1.3412
2 0.0001 0.0003 0.0004 0.0004 0.0006 0.0008 0.0005 0.0014 0.0032
p00 0.7839 0.8994 0.9698
p01 0.0103 0.0607 0.1548
p10 0.0062 0.0457 0.1155
p11 0.8498 0.9261 0.9739
p20 0.0015 0.0556 0.1903
p21 0.0317 0.1393 0.3257
Note: The transition probability, pij , represents Pr(St = j j St 1 = i). The columns labeled \LB" and
\UB" refer to the lower and upper bound of the 95% condence interval and the columns labeled \Mean"
refer to the mean of the marginal distribution of the parameter.
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Table 9: Globally Stationary or Nonstationary?
Panel A: S0 = 0 and b0 = 0
Two-State Model Three-State Model
Quartile First Median Third First Median Third
0% Growth
T=500 -0.1471 0.0006 0.1525 -1.1E+10 -3.1117 1.4E+10
T=1000 -0.1593 -0.0007 0.1497 -2.5E+21 -2.7E+07 2.6E+21
3% Growth
T=500 -0.0751 0.0005 0.0772 -3.6E+04 0.0414 4.9E+04
T=1000 -0.0790 -0.0011 0.0786 -5.9E+09 0.6536 1.1E+10
6% Growth
T=500 -0.0569 0.0003 0.0574 -4.2741 -0.0016 4.4939
T=1000 -0.0591 -0.0012 0.0584 -16.665 0.0085 20.506
10% Growth
T=500 -0.0476 0.0001 0.0463 -0.1160 0.0008 0.1205
T=1000 -0.0478 -0.0006 0.0466 -0.1175 0.0010 0.1192
13.7% Growth
T=500 -0.0423 -0.0003 0.0413 -0.0579 0.0013 0.0615
T=1000 -0.0428 -0.0004 0.0403 -0.0598 -0.0001 0.0592
Panel B: S0 = 1 and b0 = 1
Two State Model Three State Model
Quartile First Median Third First Median Third
0% Growth
T=500 -0.1476 0.0017 0.1623 6.1E+08 2.9E+11 8.9E+13
T=1000 -0.1524 -0.0028 0.1515 1.0E+19 5.2E+22 1.8E+26
3% Growth
T=500 -0.0800 -0.0007 0.0780 131.32 1.7E+05 7.2E+07
T=1000 -0.0780 -0.0007 0.0751 4.2E+05 1.3E+10 9.2E+13
6% Growth
T=500 -0.0573 -0.0003 0.0582 -0.2212 0.4199 121.10
T=1000 -0.0575 0.0006 0.0585 -1.8212 0.2312 359.11
10% Growth
T=500 -0.0481 -0.0007 0.0467 -0.1082 0.0011 0.1195
T=1000 -0.0458 0.0007 0.0467 -0.1131 0.0006 0.1172
13.7% Growth
T=500 -0.0427 -0.0009 0.0416 -0.0603 -0.0009 0.0574
T=1000 -0.0400 0.0008 0.0413 -0.0573 0.0013 0.0600
Note: We randomly draw policy shocks and policy regimes using the parameters
obtained from regressions of specication 3 and generate 5000 replications for
the time series of the debt-GDP ratio (1000 years) for various paths of the
nominal growth rate (nt), which are exogenously determined. The gures in the
table represent the rst, second, and third quartiles of the simulated distribution
with T=500 (i.e., 500 years later) and T=1000. The average growth rate over
the entire sample was 13.7 percent.
Table 10: Two-State Model for the U.S.
Panel A: Specication 3, 1840-2005
Regime 0 Regime 1
LB Mean UB LB Mean UB
 -0.0039 -0.0013 0.0014 0.0055 0.0242 0.0458
 0.8734 0.8805 0.8885 0.9025 0.9393 0.9760
2 0.00003 0.00007 0.0001 0.0004 0.0007 0.0010
p11 0.8448 0.9161 0.9702
p00 0.8635 0.9287 0.9704
Panel B: Specication 4, 1840-2005
Regime 0 Regime 1
LB Mean UB LB Mean UB
 -0.0031 -0.0012 0.0008 0.0062 0.0277 0.0518
 0.8448 0.8526 0.8594 0.8432 0.8811 0.9165
2 0.00003 0.00005 0.00007 0.0007 0.0010 0.0014
p11 0.8101 0.8922 0.9530
p00 0.8637 0.9243 0.9644
Panel C: Specication 3, 1948-2004
Regime 0 Regime 1
LB Mean UB LB Mean UB
 -0.0426 -0.0111 0.0114 -0.0182 0.0085 0.0332
 0.8478 0.8887 0.9441 0.9261 0.9699 1.0189
2 0.00005 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0004 0.0006
p11 0.8250 0.9273 0.9849
p00 0.7771 0.9068 0.9777
Panel D: Specication 4, 1948-2004
Regime 0 Regime 1
LB Mean UB LB Mean UB
 -0.0522 -0.0300 -0.0073 -0.0443 -0.0245 -0.0057
 0.8492 0.8907 0.9285 0.9330 0.9653 1.0004
2 0.00005 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 0.0004
p11 0.8379 0.9292 0.9833
p00 0.7636 0.9024 0.9794
Note: The transition probability, pij , represents Pr(St = j j St 1 = i).
The columns labeled \LB" and \UB" refer to the lower and upper bound
of the 95% condence interval and the columns labeled \Mean" refer to
the mean of the marginal distribution of the parameter.
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Table 11: Multiple Break Tests for the U.S.
Panel A: Specication 3 Panel B: Specication 4
   
Regime 1 -0.0093 0.9555 Regime 1 -0.0120 0.9167
1840-1872 ( 0.0026 ) ( 0.0240 ) 1840-1872 ( 0.0028 ) ( 0.0256 )
Regime 2 1.0009 Regime 2 0.9781
1873-1916 ( 0.0265 ) 1873-1916 ( 0.0283 )
Regime 3 1.0469 Regime 3 1.0264
1917-1943 ( 0.0125 ) 1917-1943 ( 0.0133 )
Regime 4 0.9071 Regime 4 0.8868
1944-1972 ( 0.0057 ) 1944-1972 ( 0.0061 )
Regime 5 1.0135 Regime 5 0.9450
1973-2004 ( 0.0079 ) 1973-2004 ( 0.0084 )
Note: The constant term is imposed to be identical across regimes. The maximum
number of breaks is 5 with =0.15. Figures in parentheses denote standard errors.
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Table 12: Two-State Model for the U.K.
Panel A: Specication 3
Regime 0 Regime 1
LB Mean UB LB Mean UB
 0.0837 0.1026 0.1220 -0.0341 -0.0264 -0.0180
 0.8043 0.8213 0.8369 0.9884 0.9955 1.0019
2 0.0003 0.0004 0.0005 0.0004 0.0005 0.0006
p11 0.9128 0.9544 0.9817
p00 0.6603 0.8175 0.9248
Panel B: Specication 4
Regime 0 Regime 1
LB Mean UB LB Mean UB
 -0.0033 0.0692 0.0952 -0.0411 -0.0336 -0.0239
 0.7986 0.8202 0.8686 0.9640 0.9709 0.9773
2 0.0003 0.0004 0.0005 0.0003 0.0004 0.0006
p11 0.9027 0.9474 0.9816
p00 0.6323 0.7900 0.9199
Note: The transition probability, pij , represents Pr(St = j j St 1 = i).
The columns labeled \LB" and \UB" refer to the lower and upper bound
of the 95% condence interval and the columns labeled \Mean" refer to
the mean of the marginal distribution of the parameter.
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Figure 1: Public Debt (Relative to Nominal GDP)

























Figure 2: Coecient on bt 1 Estimated from Rolling Regressions




























Figure 3: Two-State Model for Japan
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Figure 3: Two-State Model for Japan|Continued
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Figure 4: AR(2) Model
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Figure 5: Net Public Debt in Japan (Relative to Nominal GDP)














Gross Debt Net Debt
Sources: Economic Planning Agency, Report on National Accounts, 1955 to 1969, and Cabinet
Oce, Annual Report on National Accounts.
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Figure 6: Net Public Debt
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Figure 7: Automatic Stabilizers
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Figure 8: No Restriction on the Coecient on Interest Payments
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Figure 9: Three-State Model for Japan
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Figure 9: Three-State Model for Japan|Continued
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Figure 10: Globally Stationary or Nonstationary?






Path of the debt-GDP ratio with 3.0 percent growth (Specification 3 of the two-state model)






Path of the debt-GDP ratio with 13.7 percent growth (Specification 3 of the two-state model)





Path of the debt-GDP ratio with 3.0 percent growth (Specification 3 of the three-state model)






Path of the debt-GDP ratio with 13.7 percent growth (Specification 3 of the three-state model)
Note: The data of size 120 are generated from Specication 3 using estimated values with b0 = 1:7
and S0 = 1. In all cases, we replicate this procedure 5000 times to compute the rst, second, and
third quartiles.
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Figure 11: Two-State Model for the U.S.
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Figure 11: Two-State Model for the U.S.|Continued
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Figure 12: Two-State Model for the U.K.
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